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1. See generally Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery as a Takings Clause Violation, 53 Am.
U. L. REv. 191, 193 nn.4-5 (2003) (collecting legal scholarship addressing reparations);
Alfred L. Brophy, Reparations Talk: Reparations for Slavery and the Tort Law Analogy, 24 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 82-84 (2004) (noting advances in reparations discussion) [hereinaf-
ter Brophy, Reparations Talk]; Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Repa-
rations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 505-09 (2002) (discussing development
of reparations theory) [hereinafter Brophy, Some Problems].
Some of the major reparations pieces in recent years include RANDALL ROBINSON, THE
DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS (2001); SHOULD AMERICA PAY?: SLAVERY AND THE
RAGING DEBATE ON REPARATIONS (Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003) [hereinafter SHOULD
AMERICA PAY?]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987); and reparations symposia at New York University
(see Symposium, A Dream Deferred: Comparative and Practical Considerations for the Black Repara-
tions Movement, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 447 (2002)); the University of Memphis (see
Symposium, 33 U. MEM. L. REv. 245 (2003)); Boston College (see Symposium, 24 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (2004)); Boston University (see Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Slavery
Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1135 (2004)); Harvard (see Symposium, 20 HARv. BLACKLETrER
L.J. 17 (2004); and Boalt Hall (see Symposium, 6 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 1 (2004)). Mod-
ern legal reparations literature is generally acknowledged to have begun with Professor
Boris Bittker's work. See BORIS BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (Beacon Press 2d
ed. 2003) (1973).
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make up the majority of the bandwagon. The media is sometimes am-
bivalent and occasionally hostile.2 The lukewarm media reception
mirrors societal feelings in general. 3 Proposed legislation has failed to
advance in Congress.4 Recently, in a closely watched consolidated
case, a federal court dismissed reparations claims 5-a development
that could signal the death knell of all slavery reparations litigation.
Why does the theory of reparations often seem to be divorced
from the reality? Even as "reparations talk ' 6 becomes more prevalent
in legal academia, a serious gap exists between much of the scholarly
writing on reparations and the real world decisions. 7 This disjunct
may have many sources; one major contributor is the difficult nature
of establishing causation in reparations cases. This Article will address
2. See, e.g., Kevin Merida, Did Freedom Alone Pay a Nation's Debt? Rep. John Conyers Jr.
Has a Question. He's Willing to Wait a Long Time for the Right Answer, WASH. POST, Nov. 23,
1999, at C1; see also Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to
African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REv. 597, 607 n.29 (collecting media accounts); Wenger, supra
note 1, at 194 nn.6-7 (same).
3. Polls show that overwhelming majorities of whites oppose reparations, while
Blacks support reparations. See Alfred Brophy, The Cultural War over Reparations for Slavery,
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1181, 1182-85 (2004) [hereinafter Brophy, Cultural War] (discussing
statistics); see also Lee A. Harris, "Reparations" as a Dirty Word: The Norm Against Slavery Repa-
rations, 33 U. MEI. L. REV. 409, 410 n.9 (2003) (discussing these and other poll results). See
generally Taunya Lovell Banks, Exploring White Resistance to Racial Reconciliation in the United
States, 55 RUTGERS L. REv. 903, 915-19 (2003) (discussing demographics of Americans op-
posed to reparations); Michael Kranish, Blacks Rally on Capital for Slavery Reparations: Far-
rakhan Seeks Transfer of Land, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 18, 2002, at A3 (discussing these
findings from the CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll).
4. Representative John Conyers, a Michigan Democrat, first introduced a bill in 1989
that would have established a commission to study the effects of slavery and recommend
appropriate remedies. The bill died in committee and has been reintroduced (and repeat-
edly killed) every Congress since then. See H.R. 40, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 40, 107th
Cong. (2001); H.R. 40, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 40, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 891, 104th
Cong. (1995); H.R. 40, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 1684, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 3745, 101st
Cong. (1989). Representative Conyers has stated, "I have re-introduced H.R. 40 every Con-
gress since 1989, and will continue to do so until it's passed into law." John Conyers, Jr.,
U.S. Representative, The Commission to Study Reparations Proposals for African Ameri-
cans Act, Statement Before the Briefing on the Impact of Slavery on African Americans
Today (Apr. 6, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/conyers/news.reparations.htm;
see also Verdun, supra note 2, at 606-07 & n.28 (discussing proposed legislation); Wenger,
supra note 1, at 194 n.6 (same).
5. In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
The Slave Descendants case was particularly important because it was the first major repara-
tions case in federal court in ten years. Previously, in the only opinion by an appellate
court dealing with reparations, claims against the government were dismissed. See Cato v.
United States, 70 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1995). Slave Descendants took a different tack, seeking
compensation from private rather than governmental actors. Both Cato and Slave Descend-
ants are discussed in more detail infra.
6. See Brophy, Reparations Talk, supra note 1.
7. Cf id. at 83-86 (discussing the development of reparations discourse).
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the unique problems of causation and attenuation that arise in the
reparations context.
Causation is a familiar concept to legal scholars. Tort liability re-
quires a showing of proximate causation.8 Claimants must show not
only conceptual "but-for" causation-that "but for" a party's actions,
the harm would not have occurred-but must also establish legally
actionable "proximate cause." In reparations cases, the attenuated
nature of the harm makes it difficult to show proximate cause.' 0
8. See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1735, 1737-39
(1985); Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr.,
43 U. Cni. L. REv. 69, 69-72 (1975).
9. See Elizabeth C. Price, Toward a Unified Theory of Products Liability: Reviving the Caus-
ative Concept of Legal Fault, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1277, 1347 (1994) ("'Cause-in-fact,' 'factual
cause,' or 'but for' causation, as every first-year law student knows, is generally an indispen-
sable requisite to recovery in tort. It is the first head of the two-headed hydra of causation.
The other head ... is 'proximate' or 'legal' cause, a policy tool designed to cut off liability
for acts perceived as too remote, attenuated, or mere conditions."); Kim Forde-Mazrui,
Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92
CAL. L. REv. 683, 727 (2003) ("Actual causation is but a starting point for establishing
responsibility, making the causal agent 'eligible' for responsibility."); W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 264 (West 5th ed. 1984) ("As a practical
matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely connected
with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability.").
Thus, the law generally treats as actionable those "consequences which follow in unbroken
sequence, without an intervening efficient cause, from the original negligent act." See 57A
AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 491 (2004). "For such consequences the original wrongdoer is
responsible, even though he or she could not have foreseen the particular results which
did follow or results of a similar nature." Id.; see also KEETON ET AL., supra, at 301-08 (dis-
cussing intervening causes); OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAw OF TORTS 86-87 (Aspen 2d ed. 1986)
(discussing proximate cause).
10. In the words of one critic, reparations advocates point to an injury that is not
"'fairly traceable' to slavery through a chain that contains no links of independent causa-
tion." Calvin Massey, Some Thoughts on the Law and Politics of Reparations for Slavery, 24 B.C.
THIRo WORLD LJ. 157, 166 (2004) ("I am contending only that the nexus between slavery
and the present forces that produce the sense of injustice felt by black Americans today is
too attenuated to merit a judicial award of damages based on restitution."); see infra Part II
(discussing attenuation in reparations literature). For other examples of the attenuation
discussion in reparations literature, see, for example, James R. Hackney, Jr., Ideological Con-
flict, African American Reparations, Tort Causation and the Case for Social Welfare Transformation,
84 B.U. L. REV. 1193 (2004) (noting causation problems in reparations context); Art Al-
causin Hall, There Is a Lot to Be Repaired Before We Get to Reparations: A Critique of the Underlying
Issues of Race that Impact the Fate of African American Reparations, 2 SCHOLAR 1, 27-32 (2000)
(noting recurrence of the attenuation defense); EricJ. Miller, Reconceiving Reparations: Mul-
tiple Strategies in the Reparations Debate, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 45, 52 (2004) (noting the
problem of attenuation); Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other
Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 689, 708 (2003) (noting difficulty in connecting
past wrongs to present harm).
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Attenuation is diminished or failed causation." Attenuation is
typically created by a conceptual separation between two actors or
events or a dilution or weakening of the conceptual connection be-
tween the two. As such, attenuation severs theoretical "but-for" causa-
tion from legally actionable proximate cause.
This Article turns an analytical eye to attenuation arguments used
in the reparations debate-defining and examining different types of
attenuation arguments that arise in the literature. Attenuation argu-
ments as used in the reparations debate come in three types, which
this Article identifies and classifies as victim attenuation, wrongdoer
attenuation, and act attenuation. Victim attenuation is found in the
argument that modern Blacks12 have no direct connection to slaves;
wrongdoer attenuation is the argument that modern Americans tend
to lack specific individual connections to slave holders; and act attenu-
ation articulates the idea that modern injury to Blacks is unrelated to
the harms of slavery.1 3 After defining terms and examining how atten-
uation arguments are used in the slave reparations context, the Article
then discusses concepts from mass torts jurisprudence that could ap-
ply to the reparations debate.i 4
11. "[T] he longer the interval between the protected activity and the adverse employ-
ment action, the more attenuated becomes the evidence of the requisite causation."
Spadola v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 242 F. Supp. 2d 284, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). See generally 57
Am. JUR. 2D Negligence §§ 465, 491 (1989 & Supp. 2000) (discussing how temporal factors
and an intervening circumstance affect remoteness and causation analysis).
12. Throughout this Article, I will use the term "Black" rather than "black" or "Afri-
can-American." Cf Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) ("I shall
use 'African-American' and 'Black' interchangeably. When using 'Black,' I shall use an
upper-case 'B' to reflect my view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other 'minorities,'
constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.").
13. See infra Part II.A (discussing victim, wrongdoer, and act attenuation).
14. Causation and attenuation concerns have thus far received little sustained treat-
ment in the reparations literature. A number of scholars have discussed concepts of causa-
tion briefly. See, e.g., Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 519; Posner & Vermeule, supra
note 10, at 739. However, the only direct analysis of causation from the tort standpoint has
been James Hackney's short essay, Ideological Conflict, African American Reparations, Tort Cau-
sation and the Case for Social Welfare Transformation. See Hackney, supra note 10.
Hackney's analysis is similar in some ways to the analysis in this Article and provides a
useful jumping off point. Hackney suggests different types of causal problems, which are
similar to the types of attenuation analyzed in this Article. This Article, however, differs
from Hackney's essay in many respects. Its classificatory scheme identifies the problems as
stemming from attenuation and classifies them in a way that aids the analysis. This Article
also discusses how tort law has dealt with these types of attenuation and sets out a series of
suggested applications that are beyond the treatment in Hackney's essay.
This Article also builds on the pioneering work of Al Brophy, who previously noted
the conceptual problems of causation and discussed them briefly in his broad-ranging arti-
cle dealing with many of the legal arguments relating to reparations. See Brophy, Some
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In the end, the Article seeks to set out a framework for analyzing
attenuation and to work through some of the major legal attenuation
problems. It will not address all possible attenuation concerns but will
address some major legal concerns; it will also set forth a framework
for analyzing these concerns so that reparations claims can move for-
ward. A solution to the attenuation problem might allow reparations
talk to become reparations reality.
I. Background
A. Types of Reparations Claims
Claims for slavery reparations encompass a number of different
legal theories, but the two major strands are tort and unjust enrich-
ment.1 5 The most straightforward type of claims are tort claims. Slaves
suffered many deprivations that could potentially trigger tort liabil-
Problems, supra note 1, at 505 (noting problems of causation in reparations). Brophy's arti-
cle is a very useful broad survey of the many arguments that arise in reparations, and their
effects. While it is an invaluable roadmap to the theories of liability in the reparations
context, it does not focus on the particulars of causation in the level of detail set out in this
Article and does not suggest the use of mass tort tools to help solve the problem.
This Article is also limited in its own scope. This Article will primarily address attenua-
tion in reparation cases brought for the harm of slavery. Other reparations cases, such as
lawsuits brought for the Tulsa riots, present different questions of causation and will not be
discussed in any depth herein. See Keith N. Hylton, A Framework for Reparations Claims, 24
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 31, 43 (2004) [hereinafter Hylton, Framework], which states:
When thinking about reparations claims, one should avoid the mistake of viewing
them as monolithic, having the same difficulties in terms of identification of
plaintiffs, causation, and prescription of legal rights. In fact, reparations claims
vary along many legal dimensions, creating a rich array in terms of their consis-
tency with settled law.
Id. See generally ALFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RIOT OF
1921 (2002) (giving background of Tulsa riots). This Article focuses on individual repara-
tions claims, rather than on claims that might be brought by African nations seeking com-
pensation for the loss of citizens. Finally, it focuses on claims derived from the harm of
slavery itself, rather than claims based on post-emancipation acts such as racism or
segregation.
15. This is generally recognized in the literature. See, e.g., Brophy, Some Problems, supra
note 1, at 516 ("As to substantive basis, the most commonly cited bases are unjust enrich-
ment and tort.").
Other theories are possibilities. Some commentators have suggested bringing human
rights claims. For example, in provocative language that evokes the possibility of a human
rights claim, Randall Robinson suggests that slavery was "[a] massive crime against human-
ity ... an American holocaust." SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 1, at 33. And in another
article, this Author has argued that slave descendants could seek recompense under the
takings clause for taken self-ownership. Wenger, supra note 1. Despite these and other
intimations, the two dominant approaches in reparations thus far are tort and unjust
enrichment.
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ity. 16 They routinely suffered harms including physical injury, loss of
property, lost wages, loss of liberty, loss of family relations, loss of con-
sortium, and mental anguish.1 7 Their descendants suffer today from
residual racism, a consequence of slavery.18
There are also some important conceptual obstacles to any tort
claim arising from slavery. For one thing, it is unclear whether slave
owners owed a legal duty to slaves. It is also unclear whether they
owed any duty to slave descendants.19 Nevertheless, a colorable argu-
ment can be made that either slave owners indeed owed a duty to
slaves or their descendants, or that they should have been aware that
the regime of slavery was legally dubious in a way that they should not
be surprised to be held to have owed a duty to slaves or their descend-
ants. 20 For purposes of this Article, in order to focus on causation is-
sues, we will assume that slave owners owed a duty either to slaves or to
their descendants and that tort compensability of slavery is not ne-
gated by its legality at the time. 21
In addition to tort theories, reparations claims have been brought
under unjust enrichment theories. Unjust enrichment claims differ
from tort claims in significant ways. While a tort claim is a claim at law
arising from a breach of duty and a negligent or intentional harm, an
16. "Against the proper defendants, the idea of some kind of legal action designed to
punish and secure compensation seems not only sensible, but also compelling." AnthonyJ.
Sebok, Two Concepts of Injustice in Restitution for Slavery, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1405, 1417 (2004)
[hereinafter Sebok, Two Concepts].
17. See Keith N. Hylton, Slavery and Tort Law, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1209, 1213-37 (2004)
[hereinafter Hylton, Slavery] (discussing types of harms arising from slavery); Sebok, Two
Concepts, supra note 16, at 1417; see also Kevin Hopkins, Forgive US. Our Debts?, Righting the
Wrongs of Slavery, 89 GEO. L.J. 2531, 2534 (2001) ("[T]he wrongs done to African slaves
during slavery, such as the physical capture and exploitation of Africans for labor, the
inhumane treatment and abuse of slaves by white slaveholders, and the psychological
abuses in failing to acknowledge and respect African personhood, to name only a few, were
horrible and unfathomable.").
18. See, e.g., Wenger, supra note 1, at 224-26.
19. If there was no duty owed to either slaves or to future generations (or to some
other party harmed under slavery), then there is no tort claim. See KEETON ET AL., supra
note 9, at 301-20 (noting need to establish duty). In addition, if the duty owed to a party is
particularly weak, it could be viewed as affecting other aspects of tort liability, such as
causation. See generally Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 516 nn.84-85 (discussing
conceptual problems with tort liability for slavery).
20. Hylton, Slavery, supra note 17, at 1212 (arguing that slavery was a lawless regime,
and that "[a]pplying today's law to [slavery] should be viewed as bringing law to a regime
from which it had been entirely displaced . . ").
21. Tort law routinely compensates victims of harm caused by acts that were legal
when performed, such as use of asbestos or Agent Orange, or provision of tobacco or DES.
See also Hylton, Slavery, supra note 17, at 1212 (suggesting that the legality of slavery under-
mines the legitimacy of the legal system of the time).
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unjust enrichment claim is a hybrid claim in law and equity and re-
quires a claimant to show only that a defendant unjustly obtained
some benefit from the claimant that should be refunded. 22 The mea-
sure of damages is the amount of unjust gain. 23 Unjust enrichment
claims provide certain tactical advantages in mass compensation litiga-
tion and have been successfully used in Holocaust and tobacco
cases.24 Unjust enrichment claims have been brought in the slave rep-
arations context, though academics are divided as to whether they are
appropriate in this area.25 Some scholars have suggested that eco-
nomic loss should be treated as non-descendible. 26 This view is con-
tested, with others suggesting that economic loss claims ought to be
22. According to AnthonyJ. Sebok:
The minimum requirements for a claim of unjust enrichment based on quantum
meruit are: (1) A benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) an
appreciation or knowledge of the benefit by the defendant; and (3) the accept-
ance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to
make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment of its
value.
Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 16, at 1427; see also Anthony Sebok, Reparations, Unjust
Enrichment, and the Importance of Knowing the Difference Between the Two, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. St1RV.
AM. L. 651, 654-55 (2003) [hereinafter Sebok, Knowing the Difference] (further discussing
unjust enrichment); Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 521 (discussing arguments in
favor of unjust enrichment reparations compensation).
23. See Anthony Sebok, Prosaic Justice, 2002 LEGAL Anl. 51, 52 [hereinafter Sebok, Pro-
saic Justice]; Emily Sherwin, Reparations and Unjust Enrichment, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1443,
1447-49 (2004).
24. Unjust enrichment claims are less susceptible to statute of limitations defenses. See
Sebok, Knowing the Difference, supra note 22, at 653; see also Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note
16, at 1418 (noting that states in the tobacco litigation used unjust enrichment claims,
since these are less susceptible to affirmative defenses). They may have other tactical ad-
vantages. Sherwin, supra note 23, at 1449-51.
Unjust enrichment was included in the Holocaust cases through a circuitous route-
the case was originally a replevin claim, and restitution was later added as an additional
effective tool. Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 16, at 1407. The restitution claims ended up
being central in the Holocaust settlement. See id.; see also Sebok, Prosaic Justice, supra note
23, at 52. Unjust enrichment claims, however, are uniquely susceptible to equitable de-
fenses. Sebok, Knowing the Difference, supra note 22, at 655. In addition, they may be less
morally compelling than conventional tort claims. Id. at 657; Sebok, Prosaic Justice, supra
note 23, at 52-53.
25. Compare Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 16, at 1440-42 (suggesting that restitution
for deceased persons such as slaves is not conceptually coherent and should be avoided),
and Sherwin, supra note 23, at 1454-65 (arguing that unjust enrichment reparations claims
are inappropriate because they rely on resentment and retaliation), with Hanoch Dagan,
Restitution and Slavery: On Incomplete Commod/ifcation, IntergenerationalJustice, and Legal Tran-
sitions, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1139, 1158-63 (arguing that restitution claims are descendible and
appropriate in the reparations context).
26. Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 16, at 1431-41.
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viewed as descendible. 27 In any event, it is seen as practically impor-
tant; one commentator has argued that unjust enrichment is "the only
viable strategy remaining" for reparations advocates. 28 In practice, suc-
cessful litigation of an unjust enrichment claim would result in de-
fendants paying unjust enrichment damages based on whatever
amount of unjust enrichment they received from their acts. Slave de-
scendants would recover the amount of enrichment that the defend-
ants gained through involvement in slave labor or the slave trade.
In addition to the divide between tort and unjust enrichment ap-
proaches, there is also a division in reparations between ancestor-based
and descendant-based theories. That is, it is possible to bring a claim
focused on the harms done to the initial slaves (ancestor-based theo-
ries) or claims focused on the harms that slave descendants continue
to suffer today (descendant-based theories). Of course, any particular
litigant may seek to raise both ancestor and descendant-based claims.
The two different focal points bring their own advantages and
disadvantages. An ancestor-based approach will have no problem
showing harm-it is undisputed that slaves were harmed, and a strong
case can be made for restitution to them. 29 Nevertheless, since no
slaves are presently alive, an ancestor-based approach encounters diffi-
culties on remedies: should a slave descendant receive remedies for
harms done to an ancestor?
A descendant-based approach elides that difficulty but runs into
the opposite problem. Descendants will not have a problem establish-
ing that they are the proper recipient of a remedy-if they can first
establish a harm done to them. But the descendant-based theory suf-
fers from the difficult question of establishing harm-how are mod-
ern slave descendants harmed by slavery? Ultimately, each theory
depends on the resolution of the same difficult questions of causation,
such as how slaves can be connected to modern claimants.
B. General Principles of Causation
It is black letter law that a tort claimant must show causation in
order to establish liability against a defendant.30 The idea of causa-
27. Dagan, supra note 25, at 1158-64. One way to elaborate on Dagan's theory is to
suggest that unjust enrichment claims brought for property loss, rather than tort-like
claims, could be viewed as more easily passed from one generation to the next.
28. Sebok, Prosaic Justice, supra note 23, at 52.
29. See Andrew Kull, Restitution in Favor of Former Slaves, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1277 (2004)
(discussing cases of restitution to slaves found to have been wrongfully enslaved).
30. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, at 263-67.
[Vol. 40
tion, however, is often difficult to apply in particular cases. Well-
known conceptual problems may complicate any attempt to assign lia-
bility for an act to a preceding "cause" 31-while an infinite number of
factors may be considered "but-for" or "factual" causes of a harm,32
only some of those will be considered legally actionable causes-those
which the law deems "proximate."33 The determination of legal causa-
tion depends in part on whether an initial event is necessary, sufficient,
or both, in the causing of a second event.3 4
In the most simple causative scenario, an initial event is both nec-
essary and sufficient to cause a second event. For example, David
might run into Louise with his car, causing her leg to be broken. The
causative event-David's collision with Louise-is both necessary and
sufficient to cause Louise's broken leg.
When a causative event is either not necessary or not sufficient to
create a second event, causation becomes more complicated. If an ini-
tial event is not necessary, causation is overdetermined. In the classic ex-
ample, two negligently set fires merge, and a property is destroyed by
the joint fire. 35 Either fire on its own would have destroyed the prop-
erty, and so neither fire taken individually was necessary to cause the
end result. If Fire A had never been set, Fire B would still have led to
the result.
31. Every effect has multiple causes. Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9
STAN. L. REV. 60, 62 (1956); see also Wright, supra note 8, at 1737 (noting that there are
innumerable causes for each injury); id. at 1780-88 (discussing tort scholarship about mul-
tiple causes); Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases,
68 VA. L. REV. 713, 713-14 (1982) (arguing that causation is vague, can be manipulated, it
is more than a simple question of fact, and that actual cause involves policy questions just
as proximate cause does) [hereinafter Robinson, DES cases].
32. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORR, CAUSATION IN THE LAw 10-11 (Clarendon Press
1967) (1959); KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, at 266 ("M]any courts have derived a rule,
commonly known as the 'but for' or 'sine qua non' rule, which may be stated as follows:
The defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not have occurred but
for that conduct; conversely, the defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event, if the
event would have occurred without it."); GRAY, supra note 9, at 90-91 (discussing but-for
cause).
33. KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, at 263 ("An essential element of the plaintiff s cause
of action for negligence, or for that matter for any other tort, is that there be some reason-
able connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the
plaintiff has suffered. This connection usually is dealt with by the courts in terms of what is
called 'proximate cause,' or 'legal cause."'); see also GRAY, supra note 9, at 85-91 (discussing
proximate and but-for cause); Calabresi, supra note 8, at 72-76 (discussing this difference).
34. See HART & HONORS, supra note 32, at 10-20; KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, at
263-67.
35. HART & HONORE, supra note 32, at 10-15.
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In contrast, if an initial event is not sufficient to bring about a
second event, we say that causation is underdetermined.3 6 Thus, in the
well-known case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.3 7 the initial
event (negligent handling of a box) led to a chain of future events.
The box was dropped (a second necessary condition); the box con-
tained fireworks (a third necessary condition) that exploded; the ex-
plosion toppled a set of scales (a fourth necessary condition); and
finally the plaintiff was harmed.38 We would say that dropping a box is
normally not sufficient to cause such a chain of events. Causation was
found to be underdetermined in Palsgraf leading to a finding of no
liability.39 Similarly, if a sailor falls off of a ship and drowns, and the
ship did not have adequate safeguards, it may be impossible to know if
the safety measures would have saved the sailor.40 The sailor may have
been swept overboard despite the precautions; the cause of his death
is underdetermined. 4 1
Both underdetermined and overdetermined causation are com-
monly found in the mass tort context. A defendant's product may not
be necessary to cause a particular harm, making individual cases over-
determined. Where the harm manifests in a physical disease that can
have many causes, showing conventional causation can be difficult.42
As Margaret Berger notes, harms for which plaintiffs seek compensa-
tion may be "found in others who have not been exposed to the sub-
stance or product in question." 43 Thus, "it is impossible to tell whether
any individual plaintiff's injury is attributable to the product or
36. See Aaron Twerski & AnthonyJ. Sebok, Liability Without Cause? Further Ruminations
on Cause-In-Fact as Applied to Handgun Liability, 32 CONN. L. REv. 1379, 1380 (2000) ("[T] he
problem was one of underdetermination. The reason we don't know if the defendant's
breach of duty caused the injury is because we don't know whether the victim was in a
position to benefit from the increase in safety that the duty was supposed to guarantee.");
see also Malone, supra note 31, at 64-65 (stating that the process of determining causation is
often "basically one of conjecture"). See generally MICHAEL DUMMETr, FREGE: PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE (1981) (discussing the conceptual idea of underdetermination).
37. 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 101.
40. Malone, supra note 31, at 76.
41. Id.; Twerski & Sebok, supra note 36, at 1379-82.
42. See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of
Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2117, 2123 (1997) ("None of these categories of
evidence is capable, however, of proving conclusively a cause and effect relationship ....
Evidence of this kind is inherently subject to considerable uncertainty and inconclusive-
ness."); Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof Standards of Persuasion,
and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 380 (1986).
43. Berger, supra note 42, at 2122.
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whether it would have manifested itself anyhow. '44 This difficulty re-
sults from the number of causes that can contribute to a disease; as
another commentator notes, "Rarely is any particular toxic agent the
exclusive source of a given disease. Insidious diseases generally have
several sources, each of which may by itself be sufficient to bring about
the condition."45 Underdetermination is also a concern since a defen-
dant's product may lead to disease only through interaction with
other acts or circumstances. 46 Finally, mass torts typically involve a
large number of plaintiffs harmed by a defendant's product. Some of
their cases may involve simple causation, while others may have un-
derdetermined or overdetermined causative chains.
With this brief background in causation, we can now turn to the
specific case of reparations for slavery.
H. Three Types of Attenuation in Reparations
In the reparations context, many different types of arguments are
often raised to challenge the idea of causation. Such arguments use
the language of attenuation to emphasize that whatever causal rela-
tionship exists between the defendant's act and the plaintiff's harm is
insufficient to sustain a cause of action since the harm incurred is too
remote from the defendant's act. These attenuation arguments can be
divided up in a way that helps us analyze them. Some of these argu-
ments impact the causation analysis directly, while others are less di-
rectly related.
Part II examines three major thematic strands of attenuation ar-
guments that arise in discussions of reparations. Much of Part II is
descriptive and sets out various attenuation arguments as they have
been used by others. It is also classificatory, in that it will place specific
statements into one or more categories. Section A will discuss act at-
tenuation, Section B will discuss victim attenuation, and Section C will
examine wrongdoer attenuation. These interrelated but distinct com-
44. Id.; see also Gold, supra note 42, at 376-77 ("Proving the cause of injuries that
remain latent for years, are associated with diverse risk factors, and occur at background
levels even without any apparent cause, is the 'central problem' for toxic tort plaintiffs.").
45. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vi-
sion of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849, 856 (1984); see alsoJACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVID-
UALJUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 148-55 (1995) (discussing this problem); Robinson,
DES cases, supra note 31, at 759 (stating that a deterministic causation approach that as-
sumes a clean relation between an act and the injury is not useful in indeterminate cases
which require probabilistic evidence).
46. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 42, at 2123-30; Robinson, DES cases, supra note 31, at
759-60; Rosenberg, supra note 45, at 855-56.
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ponents correspond to a perceived lack of connection between de-
ceased slaves and present claimants (victim attenuation), between
slave beneficiaries (slave holders and governments) and modern citi-
zens or governments (wrongdoer attenuation), and between harmful
acts of slavery and any present injury (act attenuation).47 These the-
matic strands function as important analytical tools for understanding
the complexity of causation arguments and the nuances of attenua-
tion-based challenges.
A. Act Attenuation
The first type of attenuation argument that arises in reparations is
act attenuation-the idea that there is no direct connection between
47. Some other writers have noted the presence of some of these general themes in
reparations. See Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 505 ("There are, then, several dis-
tinct problems between connecting past and present. There are problems in connecting
the past wrongdoers with their successors (who would be the present defendants);
problems in connecting past victims with their successors (who would be the present plain-
tiffs); and connections between past wrongs and present claims."); see also id. at 502-03
("The claims are hard to fit into a traditional framework for two reasons. First, the victims
are making claims against people who are not themselves wrongdoers. Furthermore, that
defendant class may not have any current benefit from the harm. In that case, there will be
a claim asserted against a discrete group of innocent people .... Often the perpetrators
cannot be identified with specificity or are no longer alive."); Hylton, Framework, supra note
14, at 39-40 (discussing different types of claims and distinguishing them based on
whether injurers and victims are identifiable); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 10, at 698
("Reparations claims thus involve three relationships: (1) the relationship between the
original wrongdoer and the original victim; (2) the relationship between the original
wrongdoer and the possible payer of reparations; and (3) the relationship between the
original victim and the possible claimant or beneficiary of reparations. The claimant must
show that each relationship is of the proper type."); id. at 699 ("Compensatory justice re-
quires a relationship of identity between the wrongdoer and payer and a relationship of
identity between the victim and claimant."); Alfreda Robinson, Corporate Social Responsibility
and African American Reparations: Jubilee, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 309, 365 (2003) (noting that
opponents of reparations focus on specific difficulties including "the absence of directly
harmed individuals," "the absence of individual perpetrators," and "the lack of direct cau-
sation") [hereinafter Robinson, Corporate Responsibility]; Verdun, supra note 2, at 628-30
("Opponents of reparations to African Americans argue that living whites have not injured
living African Americans; the wrongs of slavery were committed by individuals who have
been dead for years. African Americans living today were never slaves, and are not entitled
to wages for slave labor performed over one hundred years ago.").
Little of the existing scholarship discusses the significance of these different variants
of attenuation, or seeks to classify and analyze these divisions, as I do in this Article. The
closest analogue is James Hackney's analysis in his recent essay. See Hackney, supra note 10,
at 1195-97 (discussing "identification, boundary, and source" causation issues). However,
Hackney's analysis, which is briefer than the discussion and analysis in this Article, differs
from my analysis in several respects. Hackney's essay uses a preliminary discussion of some
causation issues to frame an analysis that focuses on social welfare discussions. In contrast,
this Article focuses on the causation concerns themselves, and how they could be ad-
dressed by using conceptual tools from the mass torts context.
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past wrongdoing and present harm. Act attenuation is not unique to
reparations but is a common theme in much of tort litigation. For
example, Palsgraf with its unique chain of events leading to the ulti-
mate injury, gives an example of act attenuation. 48 Act attenuation
may be created by overdetermined or underdetermined causation.
Act attenuation is an attack on the move from conceptual but-for cau-
sation to legally actionable proximate cause.49
Act attenuation is also a common objection to slavery repara-
tions. 50 One critic notes that a "problematic consideration is causa-
tion, which invokes the question of whether the injury presently
complained of was a foreseeable product of the defendant's con-
duct .... [I] t is necessary to wrestle with the issue of whether that past
conduct has caused injury to a contemporary plaintiff."51 This objec-
tion is easy to understand. It can be difficult, after all, to connect the
harms of slavery to specific disadvantages of Blacks today. Indeed, it is
not easy to characterize Blacks as a cohesive economic group at all.
There are vast differences in wealth, status, and class among individ-
ual Blacks. 52 Some individuals appear to have integrated smoothly
into society, while others have not.53
The difficulty of unraveling potential contributing or ameliorat-
ing causes leads to act attenuation. Thus, a "lack of sufficient connec-
tion between past wrong and present claim" is an argument that Mari
J. Matsuda calls one of the "standard doctrinal objections to repara-
48. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
49. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, at 266.
50. See, e.g., BIrrTaR, supra note 1, at 9; Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 518-19.
Attenuation is not a special or uniquely high hurdle to forestall reparations claims, though
they may be unusually susceptible to this defense. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 10, at
711. Attenuation is a familiar bugbear for civil rights advocates. See Maria L. Marcus, Learn-
ing Together: Justice Marshall's Desegregation Opinions, 61 FORDH-AM L. Rv. 69, 90-95 (1992)
(noting Supreme Court use of attenuation to rule against desegregation claims).
There is certainly no agreement by reparations advocates that proximate cause is not
satisfied. Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 523-25; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 9, at
728-33 (arguing that chain of proximate causation has not been broken by actions of slave
descendants).
51. Massey, supra note 10, at 162-63.
52. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 375. Of course, despite these differences, Blacks are
overwhelmingly less well-off than whites. See generally Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone, Is
It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REv. 429, 471-72 (1998).
53. As Mari Matsuda notes, "Not all members of the victim group are similarly situ-
ated. Some are rich, some poor. Some feel betrayed, others do not. Some are easily identi-
fiable as group members, others have weak claims to membership." Matsuda, supra note 1,
at 375.
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tions. ' '5 4 Similarly, media and pundit statements discuss act attenua-
tion. 55 A number of critics suggest that shortcomings of Blacks,
individually or as a group, are responsible for any present injury. 56
Act attenuation affects reparations cases not only at trial or the
motion stage, where it affects a showing of tort causation, but also has
important indirect effects on claimants' very right to press a claim.
Courts only allow claims by those who can show standing-that is, a
direct connection between a wrongful act and a claimant's injury.5 7
Act attenuation is a factor in standing inquiry; as the Supreme Court
has stated, a relevant question in deciding standing is, "Is the line of
causation between the illegal conduct and injury too attenuated?' 58
Act attenuation is a normal obstacle that arises in many cases, not
just those involving reparations. Many claimants bring cases where
causation is either overdetermined or underdetermined. In particu-
lar, those kinds of issues often arise in mass compensation cases where
a connection between initial acts and resulting harms may not always
be clear.
Some conceptual tools exist to deal with the problem of act atten-
uation. For example, unjust enrichment claims may elude act attenua-
tion because unjust enrichment depends only on a showing that a
defendant was unjustly enriched.59 In addition, some scholars suggest
that courts are likely to overlook act attenuation concerns in certain
54. Id. at 385. Matsuda's other standard objections are "factual objections and excuse
or justification for illegal acts[;] difficult identification of perpetrator and victim groups;
[and] difficulty of calculation of damages." Id. at 373-74; see also id. at 374 ("The problem
of specific identification of wrongdoers and victims is a common objection to
reparations.").
55. Horowitz writes that reparations is "based on the unfounded claim that all Afri-
can-American descendants of slaves suffer from the economic consequences of slavery and
discrimination" and that "[n]o evidence-based attempt has been made to prove that living
individuals have been adversely affected by a slave system that was ended over 150 years
ago." David Horowitz, Ten Reasons Why Reparations for Blacks Is a Bad Idea for Blacks-and
Racist Too, FRONT PAGE, Jan. 3, 2001, at 6, available at http://www.frontpagemag.com/Arti-
cles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=l 153.
56. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 9, at 728-33 (discussing these arguments); see also
Hylton, Framework, supra note 14, at 35-37 (discussing differences in Black and white family
structure).
57. See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 380-81 ("The linkage of victims and perpetrators for
acts occurring in the immediate past is another trait of standard legal claims."); see also
Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 505 ("Closely related to the difficulty of identifica-
tion of victims and wrongdoers is the requirement that there be a close connection be-
tween past wrong and present claim."); Verdun, supra note 2, at 624 (noting this
requirement in affirmative action). This is a common theme in tort law. See, e.g., FED. R.
Ctv. P. 23 (setting out commonality requirement in class action lawsuits).
58. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
59. See Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 16, at 1416-17.
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cases, such as those involving personal injuries.60 Nevertheless, the
general route for overcoming act attenuation is a factual one, and
claimants generally overcome the problem by showing evidence of
causal links.
Act attenuation is an important theme in any discussion of repa-
rations. In addition to the standard act attenuation concerns that arise
in reparations, intergenerational mass harm claims such as slave repa-
rations involve two more specialized variants of the lack of causation
argument which this Article addresses below.
B. Victim Attenuation
The first of the two more specialized concerns is what this Article
calls victim attenuation. Victim attenuation is the idea that modern
claimants are insufficiently linked to the original harmed parties. This
lack of connection creates victim attenuation, a concern that is typi-
cally present only in intergenerational claims. Victim attenuation con-
cerns arise not only in slavery reparations cases but in others that seek
compensation for intergenerational harms, including cases involving
harms to Native Americans, Holocaust victims, and Japanese
internees. 61
In the slavery context, victim attenuation is manifested in the ar-
gument that Blacks today are not sufficiently linked to slaves and are
thus undeserving of any recompense for slavery.62 The basic idea un-
derlying this concern is intuitive. Blacks living today were not directly
subject to the harms of slavery.63 Many Blacks may be slave descend-
ants, but many others are more recent arrivals who lack that connec-
60. Id. at 1439-41.
61. See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 364-68, 381-85; William Bradford, Beyond Repara-
tions, 66 OHIo ST. LJ. 1, 52-60 (2005).
62. A related concern is that slave descendants today would not exist but for slavery
and therefore are not entitled to recompense. See, e.g., Stephen Kershnar, The Inheritance-
Based Claim to Reparations, 8 LEGAL THEORY 243, 247-51 (2002).
63. "Opponents also argue that African Americans today were never slaves and did
not directly experience the injustices of slavery and its effects and thus are not entitled to
any form of reparations." Hall, supra note 10, at 30; see also Brophy, Some Problems, supra
note 1, at 518-20; Miller, supra note 10, at 52; Horowitz, supra note 55.
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tion as well. 64 Present claimants are not original victims and may have
a relatively low proportion of descent.65
This concern appears in the literature on reparations. Stephen
Kershnar argues that modern Blacks have only "token" rights of repa-
rations because they are not sufficiently connected to slaves. 66 Keith
Hylton suggests that reparations claims must be treated as derivative
claims under tort law-that is, claims that depend on the wrong done
to another party rather than any harm done to the party bringing
suit-which means that as a practical matter they will most likely fail.6 7
Al Brophy notes that "[f] ormulating a legal claim ... involves linking
past victims with people who are making a claim in the present-or
what one might call present victims of past discrimination. 6 8 Media
critics of reparations for slavery also emphasize victim attenuation. 69
Victim attenuation concerns have been paramount in judicial de-
cisions on reparations. Victim attenuation directly affects the legal
analysis of a claimant's standing. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in Cato v. United States,70 dismissed reparations claims
brought against the government, stating that:
Cato proceeds on a generalized, class-based grievance; she neither
alleges, nor suggests that she might claim, any conduct on the part
of any specific official or as a result of any specific program that has
run afoul of a constitutional or statutory right and caused her a
discrete injury. Without a concrete, personal injury that is not ab-
64. See Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 519; Graham Hughes, Reparations for
Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1968) (noting difficulties in identifying plaintiffs);
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 10, at 739; see also Linda Chavez, Promoting Racial Harmony,
in THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 314, 314-22 (George E. Curry ed., 1996) (noting vic-
tim attenuation concerns relating to affirmative action); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 10,
at 712 (discussing victim attenuation in affirmative action); Verdun, supra note 2, at 623
(same).
65. See Hopkins, supra note 17, at 2542-48 (discussing different levels of slave descent
among reparations claimants).
66. Kershnar, supra note 62, at 251-58; see also Janna Thompson, Historical Injustice
and Reparation: Justifying Claims of Descendants, 112 ETHICS 114, 116-21 (2001) (suggesting
that the passage of time precludes reparations).
67. Hylton, Slavery, supra note 17, at 1238-45.
68. Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 504.
69. For example, one critic argues that "it is obscene to think of this modern genera-
tion of black Americans profiting from the blood money drawn nearly 140 years ago from
the exploitation of slaves."Juan Williams, Slavery Isn't the Issue, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2002, at
A26; see also Adolph Reed, On Reparations, PROGRESSIVE, Dec. 2000, 15, 16-17 (noting diffi-
culty of connecting modern victims with slave ancestors); Merida, supra note 2, at C-01.
Merida notes that "[o] pponents say there is no precedent for paying people who are dead,
that reparations are usually awarded to survivors." Merida, supra note 2, at C-8.
70. 70 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1995).
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stract and that is fairly traceable to the government conduct that
she challenges as unconstitutional, Cato lacks standing.7 1
Similarly, the district court in the recent In re African-American
Slave Descendants Litigation72 decision dismissed a number of consoli-
dated claims in related cases brought against corporations.7 3 The
court wrote:
Plaintiffs' alleged injury is derivative of the injury inflicted upon
enslaved African-Americans over a century ago .... This is insuffi-
cient to establish standing, and contrary to centuries of well-settled
legal principles requiring that a litigant demonstrate a personal
stake in an alleged dispute .... Plaintiffs cannot establish a per-
sonal injury sufficient to confer standing by merely alleging some
genealogical relationship to African-Americans held in slavery over
one-hundred, two-hundred, or three-hundred years ago.7 4
Plaintiffs sought to establish standing by arguing that they were
slave descendants and claiming that, as the rightful heirs of their an-
cestors' assets, they suffered injury because their ancestors were not
compensated for their labor.75 The court disagreed: "Plaintiffs' claim
to the economic wealth of their ancestors' labor is conjectural. While
most would like to assume that they will be the beneficiaries of their
ancestors' wealth upon their demise, this is a mere assumption." 76 In
addition, the court ruled that the plaintiffs did not meet the require-
ments for third party standing: "Plaintiffs have not alleged a legally
sufficient relation to their ancestors. All that Plaintiffs allege is a gene-
71. Id. at 1109. The court elaborated, "she does not trace the presence of discrimina-
tion and its harm to the United States rather than to other persons or institutions. Accord-
ingly, Cato lacks standing to bring a suit setting forth the claims she suggests." Id. at 1110.
72. 375 F. Supp. 2d 721 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
73. Id. That consolidated case proceeded under a different theory than Cato; it was
brought not against the government but against corporations whose predecessor entities
had benefited from slavery. Despite this difference, the issue of standing again proved
decisive. The court initially dismissed claims in January 2004, giving leave to replead. See In
reAfrican-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. I11. 2004). InJuly 2005,
the amended complaint was dismissed, in a substantially similar opinion. Slave Descendants
Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d at 721; see Anthony Sebok, The Lawsuit Brought by African-Americans
Seeking Compensation from Corporations for the Wrongs of Slavery: Why the Opinion Dismissing the
Suit Is Unpersuasive, FINDLAW, Aug. 8, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20050808.
html [hereinafter Sebok, The Lawsuit] (noting similarity between the 2004 decision dis-
missing the original complaint and the 2005 decision dismissing the amended complaint).
The case was dismissed in part because of standing and attenuation issues, and in part
because of the statute of limitations. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d at 770-80
(discussing statutes of limitation); id. at 775-80 (discussing exceptions to the statute of
limitations). See generally Robinson, Corporate Responsibility, supra note 47, at 366-68 (discuss-
ing statutes of limitations); Wenger, supra note 1, at 244-48 (same).
74. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d at 748, 752.
75. Id. at 748.
76. Id.
Winter 2006]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
alogical relationship, and more is required under the law in order to
confer third-party standing." 77
The difference between victim and act attenuation is subtle.
While act attenuation is an assertion that a claimant has suffered no
legally cognizable harm, victim attenuation is an assertion that the
claimant is a person who should not bring a claim at all. In the con-
text of descendant-based reparations suits, victim attenuation asserts
that modern claimants are insufficiently linked to harmed parties,
thus relying on act attenuation-the lack of a connection between a
tort inflicted on a slave and any perceived present day harm. In the
context of slave-based reparations, victim attenuation is not depen-
dent on act attenuation but rather on the intergenerational gap itself
and on the idea that modern claimants are not good representatives
of slaves, who may have themselves once had colorable claims. Thus,
concerns of victim and act attenuation are interrelated. Victim attenu-
ation problems of standing exist because courts are unsure that cur-
rent claimants can show they have been harmed. The same perceived
inability to show harm would inevitably create act attenuation con-
cerns at any trial. Nevertheless, a weaker connection between victims
and harm may satisfy the victim attenuation standing concerns, while
a stronger connection might eventually need to be shown to establish
causation at trial.
Victim attenuation defenses potentially apply to both tort and un-
just enrichment claims. Victim attenuation has arisen on both sides of
the Slave Descendants litigation, for example. 78 And both types of
claims have foundered in court due at least in part to victim attenua-
tion. 79 Conceptually, to the extent that victim attenuation is an out-
growth, in part, of act attenuation, then unjust enrichment claims-
some of which are less subject to act attenuation-may also be less
susceptible to victim attenuation defenses.
C. Wrongdoer Attenuation
The third type of attenuation argument, wrongdoer attenuation,
exists because present-day citizens and governments may not be
closely connected to slave owners, suggesting that perhaps they should
77. Id. at 753. As the court noted, the requirement is that the party asserting third
party standing show some injury in fact, and that that party also show that prudential con-
siderations weigh in its favor. Id. at 752-53.
78. Id. at 752; see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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not be required to pay for harms caused by slavery.80 Many modern
non-Blacks are not descendants of slave owners and have no apparent
direct connections to them.8 All living descendants are a generation
or more removed from slave owners. 82 In addition, it is likely that
most or all slave owner descendants have at least some ancestors that
were nonslaveholders-and many are mixed descendants who have
ancestry traceable both to slaveowners and to slaves themselves. 83 All
80. See Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 519 ("The people who perpetrated the
crimes of slavery are gone and their estates are (mostly) distributed. A few corporations
survive and some of the money made from slavery is traceable to currently existing bank
accounts. However, there are significant problems in imposing the liability of past genera-
tions of private actors on the current generation."); see also Matsuda, supra note 1, at 375
("[O]f those taxpayers who must pay the reparations, some are direct descendants of per-
petrators while others are merely guilty by association. Under a reparations doctrine, the
working class whites whose ancestors never harbored any prejudice or ill-will toward the
victim group are taxed equally with the perpetrators' direct descendants for the sins of the
past."); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 10, at 736 ("Reparations are rarely paid by the
original wrongdoers, that is, the individuals who performed the wrongful acts, whether or
not on behalf of a state or corporate body. Substantive moral considerations must explain
why nonwrongdoers-usually taxpayers or shareholders-should pay reparations; when
these considerations fail, prudential considerations must be invoked."); Hall, supra note
10, at 30 ("White America today attempts to distance itself from both the 'sins of slavery'
and of its forefathers, in an effort to deny responsibility for the past and present problems
associated with race. Opponents of African American reparations contend that slavery and
past injustices by White Americans were not conducted by individuals living today, but
rather by individuals long dead.").
81. This is recognized in the reparations literature. See, e.g., Brophy, Some Problems,
supra note 1, at 519; Miller, supra note 10, at 52; Verdun, supra note 2, at 629-30. And many
modern Americans may not feel any sort of link to slave owners. However, based on casual
observation, there seems to be at least some degree of connection that many white
southerners feel for former slaveholders. This can be seen, for instance, in the detailed
civil war role-playing activities; the continued prevalence of statues of confederate generals;
the politically popular use of the confederate flag; and the resurgence of historical socie-
ties such as the Daughters of the Confederacy. Reparations opponents may be more con-
nected to the past, and in particular to the slave-owning past, than they tend to admit in
discussions about liability. SeeJason Zengerle, Lost Cause, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 2, 2004, 14
(discussing popularity of Confederate reenactment and historical groups); see also Carter
Davis, Race and Reparations, CiTy MAG. (Tuscaloosa, Ala.), Apr. 24, 2004, at 5, available at
http://www.al.com/printer/printer.ssP/base/news/ 1082801701197890.xml (last visited
Nov. 27, 2005).
82. Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 16, at 1419-20.
83. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 10, at 740. According to these authors:
The more difficult problem exists when the wrongdoing occurs on a large scale,
and the wrongdoers and victims miscegenate, or their descendants miscegenate.
A descendant of a victim might therefore also be the descendant of a wrongdoer.
With sufficient mixing, reparations become pointless. It makes no sense for a per-
son to pay reparations from one pocket to the other. Even with more limited
mixing, one must grapple with the question whether to treat people differently
on the basis of how many ancestors belong to the class of victims and how many
belong to the class of wrongdoers.
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of this serves to greatly complicate the task of apportioning blame to
living defendants. Thus, Vincene Verdun sums up the concepts un-
derlying wrongdoer attenuation as follows:
From the dominant perspective, it would be patently unfair to
make all white people or society pay for slavery because that would
necessarily include people who did not participate in the wrong.
These people include whites who are descendants of abolitionists
and non-slaveholders, and immigrants, or descendants of immi-
grants, who came to this country after slavery was abolished; post
slavery immigrants cannot be connected with a wrong associated
with slavery.84
Wrongdoer attenuation undercuts the moral force of reparations
arguments, which are often presented as a demand for justice.85
Wrongdoer attenuation arguments may take the form of statistics,
such as noting the number of people who have arrived in the country
since 1865, the percentage of the populace descending from post-bel-
lum immigrants, and so forth. 86
While victim attenuation may evoke the possibility of an unjusti-
fied windfall, wrongdoer attenuation brings to mind the image of an
unjustified penalty.8 7 This is a strongly negative image to overcome in
a society that places high value, at least rhetorically, on the protection
Id.
84. Verdun, supra note 2, at 630; see also The Conversation, WASH. PosT, July 23, 2000, at
F4 ("As a white woman, I am tired of being blamed for slavery because-and only be-
cause-I am white, when the fact of the matter is I am descended from Irish and German
immigrants who didn't arrive on Ellis Island until well after the Civil War.") (statement of
Peggy Sakagawa); Massey, supra note 10, at 162. Brophy notes that legal liability "requires
linking past perpetrators with people who currently exist." Brophy, Some Problems, supra
note 1, at 504.
85. Reparations advocates often use the language of culpability in reparations litera-
ture, though there has been some recent movement towards a less confrontational tone.
See Miller, supra note 10, at 49-52 (arguing that reparations advocates have created
problems by being unnecessarily confrontational); see also Brophy, Some Problems, supra note
1, at 519 n.94 ("My point is that in talking about reparations for slavery and Jim Crow, one
must be careful in talking about claims of victims against perpetrators, when many of the
people against whom claims are being asserted are not perpetrators."); Alfred Brophy, Tak-
ing Reparations Seriously 16 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) ("For
many reparationists, the focus is upon past harm as a way of arguing for reparations.
Among others there seems to be little interest in reconciliation. But those voices are not
the leaders in the field. They do not represent the most thoughtful reparationists."). Id. at
16. See generally Lee A. Harris, Political Autonomy as a Form of Reparations, 29 S.U. L. Rav. 25
(2001); Lee A. Harris, "Reparations" as a Dirty Word: The Norm Against Slavery Reparations, 33
U. MEM. L. REv. 409 (2003).
86. See Horowitz, supra note 55, at 3-4.
87. SeeJeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4, 26-27 (1992) (not-
ing these concerns). In addition, reparations opponents sometimes suggest that past acts,
such as the Civil War, constitute sufficient payments for slavery. See, e.g., Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 10, at 730-31 (noting this argument); Horowitz, supra note 55, at 9.
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of the innocent.88 As Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule note, "[a]
strong tradition in the United States holds that individuals are not
blameworthy for acts over which they have no control."89 Group sanc-
tions are an exception. 90
Wrongdoer attenuation has played a part in derailing proposed
reparations legislation. Representative Henry Hyde, then-chair of the
House Judiciary Committee, argued:
The notion of collective guilt for what people did [200-plus] years
ago, that this generation should pay a debt for that generation, is
an idea whose time has gone. I never owned a slave. I never op-
pressed anybody. I don't know that I should have to pay for some-
one who did [own slaves] generations before I was born.9 1
The political wrongdoer attenuation argument is couched in the
moral language of wrong and right, rather than in legal language. 92
Similar moral-inflected arguments are used by many prominent media
critics of reparations.
93
88. Verdun, supra note 2, at 620-22.
89. Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 548 (noting that American law typically ties
legal liability to moral culpability); Daryl Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STrAN. L. REv. 345,
347-48 (2003); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 10, at 699.
90. In instances where group sanctions are tolerated, it is often as a form of deter-
rence, see Levinson, supra note 89, at 348-49, and such consequentialistjustification would
not apply to the case of reparations for slavery. See Massey, supra note 10, at 165 (noting
that reparations have no deterrent value); see also Levinson, supra note 89, at 347-48 (not-
ing that Blacks have been subjected to collective sanctions in the past).
91. See Merida, supra note 2, at C-8; see also 136 CONG. REc. S1312-03 (Feb. 21, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Bumpers) (stating that "I am a son of the South. But I never owned a
slave. My father never owned a slave" in arguing that modem Turkey should not be blamed
for the Armenian genocide).
92. See Eric Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African Ameri-
can Claims, 40 B.C. L. REv. 477, 496-97 (1998) (discussing the political component of repa-
rations arguments).
93. For example, Armstrong Williams criticizes the reparations movement for
"seek[ing] to penalize our current government for what white slaveholders did centuries
ago." Armstrong Williams, Presumed Victims, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 1, at 167;
see also id. at 170 (noting conceptual difficulty in assessing reparations against post-bellum
immigrants). John McWhorter argues that some "obvious retorts" to the idea of repara-
tions include "that many whites in America today arrived after emancipation [and] that
many whites owned no slaves." John McWhorter, Against Reparations, in SHOULD AMERICA
PAY?, supra note 1, at 191. David Horowitz has stated that reparations are inappropriate
because "[olnly a tiny minority of white Americans ever owned slaves" and "most [modern]
Americans have no connection (direct or indirect) to slavery," among other reasons.
Horowitz, supra note 55, at 1. This article was widely distributed and received nationwide
attention. See Brophy, Cultural War, supra note 3, at 1201. Michelle Malkin writes that repa-
rations advocates seek payments from "the U.S. government, which means American tax-
payers, which means tens of millions of people who had nothing remotely whatsoever to do
with inflicting such injustice on anyone." Michelle Malkin, Get Out Your Reparations Calcula-
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Like victim attenuation, wrongdoer attenuation is not stricdy a
causation argument. Rather, it is an attack on the identity of the party
against whom a claim is made. And like victim attenuation, it may be
used in tandem with more traditional act attenuation arguments. Un-
like victim attenuation, however, it is not limited to cases of in-
tergenerational harm. "You got the wrong guy, judge," is a standard
line of defense in many cases. And wrongdoer attenuation intersects
with other kinds of attenuation, including act attenuation, in various
ways. 94
The strength of wrongdoer attenuation arguments will vary with a
number of factors, primarily the identity of the party against whom a
claim is asserted. Thus, this line of defense can be partially avoided
through smart lawyering. Many reparations claims are brought against
corporations, and these corporate entities may in fact be the same
legal entity as that which originally harmed slaves.9 5 Because this step
avoids wrongdoer attenuation, many reparations cases involve such
long-lived entities.9 6 But that move, while lessening wrongdoer attenu-
ation, can increase act attenuation, since the particular corporate en-
tor, ToWNHALL.COM, Aug. 15, 2002, available at http://www.townhall.com/columnists/
michellemalkin/mm20020815.shtml.
Other, less oppositional voices have also wondered about these concerns. Kevin Me-
rida, a relatively sympathetic Washington Post reporter, frames the potential issue as: "Why
should American taxpayers who never owned slaves pay for the sins of ancestors they don't
even know? And what about those whose ancestors arrived here long after slavery ended?"
Merida, supra note 2, at C-01.
94. One strain of wrongdoer attenuation argument is similar to the idea of over-deter-
mination. That is, modern parties can assert the wrongdoer attenuation argument that
"[e]ven if my ancestor had decided to pay his slaves, the generalized harm to slave descend-
ants would have taken place anyway."
This is an overdetermination argument, similar to saying that "since a hundred other
people also poisoned the well, my own act of poisoning the well should not be viewed as
causative of decedent's death." Thus, it is similar to the legal doctrine of substantial factor
(that is, that a defendant is not liable unless her acts were a substantial factor in causing a
harm). See infra Part IV.B.4 (discussing substantial factor). This kind of argument, while
internally consistent, lacks the moral force of most wrongdoer attenuation arguments.
95. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
96. There are conceptual questions about the validity of corporate punishment over
time, since the burden falls on shareholders who were not owners of the corporation at the
time the wrong occurred. See generallyJohn C. Coffee, No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386 (1981)
(discussing theoretical problems with punishing corporate entities); Jennifer Arlen & Wil-
liam Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud Based on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992
U. ILL. L. REv. 691, 699-702 (1992) (noting that economic loss for securities often falls on
innocent shareholders).
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tity against whom the suit is brought may be removed from direct
participation in harmful acts. 9 7
Like victim attenuation, wrongdoer attenuation may be a less
compelling defense against claims of unjust enrichment. This is be-
cause unjust enrichment claims are not based on the guilt of a particu-
lar defendant, only on a showing that he has been enriched. Despite
this theoretical advantage, wrongdoer attenuation concerns were
voiced by the Slave Descendants court as it dismissed reparations claims,
noting that "[t]he allegations of Plaintiffs' [complaint] do not link
these Defendants to the alleged harm"98 and that the "[complaint] is
devoid of any allegations that connect the specifically named Defend-
ants or their predecessors and any of the Plaintiffs or their
ancestors." 9
9
D. Recap
These three types of attenuation are used, often together, to sug-
gest that reparations for slavery would not be appropriate. These criti-
ques are not unique to the case of Black slavery reparations, and
similar arguments apply in most or all reparations-type actions.100
The problem of attenuation arises repeatedly in the literature.
Many commentators suggest that attenuation fatally undercuts the
case for reparations. Such an assessment reflects judicial reality at pre-
sent. In Slave Descendants, the court based parts of its opinion on all
three types of attenuation. It mentioned wrongdoer attenuation-
"[t]he allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint do not link these Defendants
to the alleged harm" 10 1-and act attenuation-"Plaintiffs' Complaint
is devoid of any allegations that any specific conduct of the Defend-
ants was a cause of the continuing injuries of which Plaintiffs com-
97. There are exceptions to this general trend. For example, Holocaust litigants
bringing suit against Ford Motor Company for its use of slave labor avoided both wrong-
doer attenuation-the company was the same entity-and act attenuation, since the link
between the act and the harm was clear. See generally Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in
America: Litigating the Holocaust in United States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 204-06 (2000)
(discussing Ford litigation).
98. In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 749 (N.D. Ill.
2005).
99. Id. at 740.
100. See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 372 (discussing attenuation defense in connection
with reparations claims by Native Hawaiians); see also Posner & Vermeule, supra note 10, at
699-711 (noting these types of objections to reparations generally).
101. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d at 749 (emphasis added). The court also
wrote that the "[Complaint] is devoid of any allegations that connect the specifically
named Defendants or their predecessors and any of the Plaintiffs or their ancestors." Id. at
740.
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plain."'10 2 In particular, the Slave Descendants court, like the Cato court,
focused on victim attenuation.1 0 3 Thus, the problems of victim, wrong-
doer, and act attenuation certainly have been decisive in derailing
reparations suits in court.10 4
III. Preclusive Effects of Act, Victim, and Wrongdoer
Attenuation in the Reparations Suits
The presence of all three kinds of attenuation creates a particu-
larly difficult hurdle for those seeking reparations. Attenuation con-
cerns operate in legal and moral arenas to create doubts about the
viability of any judicial or legislative progress towards a reparations
settlement. 05
102. Id. at 750.
103. Id. at 752; see also In reAfrican-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027,
1067-68 (N.D. Ill. 2004) ("Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to connect any alleged injury of any
one of the Plaintiffs or their ancestors to alleged conduct by any one of the Defendants or
their predecessors .... [T]he allegations in a complaint must be those relating to the
plaintiff, not those of someone else.").
104. Other reparations cases in the courts have largely followed the reasoning of Cato
without further discussion. See Bell v. United States, No. Civ. A. 301CV0338D, 2001 WL
1041792, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2001) (citing Cato in holding that plaintiff lacked stand-
ing); Bey v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 95 CIV 10401, 1996 WL 413684, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1996) (same); Langley v. United States, No. C 95-4227, 1995 WL 714378,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 1995) (same); see also Himiya v. United States, No. 94 C 4065,
1994 WL 376850, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 1994) (citing Cato in dismissing on sovereign
immunity grounds).
105. Attenuation concerns are manifested in two different spheres. First, attenuation
comes up in the moral sphere, with concerns that it is somehow wrong for reparations to
be paid by those who are not connected to slavery. Cf Forde-Mazrui, supra note 9, at 685
(discussing moral arguments about reparations and affirmative action). Second, attenua-
tion arises in the legal sphere, with objections that reparations cannot, for legal reasons, be
paid to plaintiffs who lack standing or a more direct connection to the slaves who were
harmed. See, e.g., supra Parts II.A-D (discussing the legal effects of attenuation).
These are opposite sides of the same coin. Massey, supra note 10, at 157 ("When grap-
pling with providing reparations for slavery, two distinct categories of issues emerge: legal
and political."). And just as the idea of reparations is based on a joint legal and moral
argument, attenuation provides ajoint legal and moral counter-argument. See Miller, supra
note 10, at 50-51 which states:
Reparations, on this account, involves a demand for restoration of the ill-gotten
gains of slavery to the group that was wronged. In so doing, it suggests both a
legal strategy and an emotionally compelling moral argument. The legal strategy
requires us to identify the various ways that blacks were harmed by whites who
profited from slavery and then to sue for the repayment of those profits either to
individuals or into some central fund for more general disbursement. The moral
argument asserts that whites as a group were, and continue to be, responsible for
the ills of the African American community. It is the power and simplicity of that
moral claim that makes reparations at once so compelling an argument and so
difficult for the vast majority of whites to endorse.
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It is often suggested in the reparations literature that successful
resolution of slave reparations litigation may be a natural extension of
other successful mass litigation, such as restitution to Holocaust vic-
tims orJapanese internees. 10 6 In particular, the Holocaust victim cases
did not involve the level of victim attenuation present in slave repara-
tions. As Bert Neuborne, who helped lead the Holocaust restitution
effort, writes, "[t]he Holocaust cases dealt with a first-generation ef-
fort" to return "identifiable property from the unjustly enriched
holder of the property to its true owner or a close relative."1 0 7 The
settlement provided limited recovery for heirs of very recently de-
ceased class members, but nothing nearly on the level that slave repa-
rations would require. 10 8 The Holocaust litigation also avoided
wrongdoer attenuation by focusing on existing governments and cor-
porate entities. 109 Thus, the litigation arguably only suffered from one
type of attenuation, act attenuation.
Neuborne notes this difference, writing that largely due to atten-
uation problems, "[t] he lines of identity have become so blurred" in
slave reparations that "today's remedy may be more political than le-
gal." 110 That assessment alone does not mean that reparations litiga-
tion is fruitless. The reparations movement, like the Holocaust
compensation movement before it, is composed of "an untidy mixture
of law, politics and raw emotion.""11 In the Holocaust cases, legal
claims did not prevail qua legal claims, but rather allowed advocates to
Id.; cf Yamamoto, supra note 92, at 518 ("Those seeking reparations need to draw on the
moral force of their claims (and not frame it legally out of existence) while simultaneously
radically recasting reparations in a way that both materially benefits those harmed and
generally furthers some larger interests of mainstream America.").
106. See, e.g., Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 499 ("A second factor leading to
the reinvigoration of talk about reparations for slavery and Jim Crow are the models of
reparations that other groups-Native Americans, Holocaust victims, Japanese Americans
interned during World War II, South Africans-have obtained.").
107. Bert Neuborne, Holocaust Reparations Litigation, Lessons for the Slavery Reparations
Movement, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. Am. L. 615, 621 (2003); Brophy, Some Problems, supra note
1, at 512 (noting that Holocaust recompense claims differ from slave reparations because
"there are quite specific claims for identifiable property or specific torts.").
108. See Madeline Doms, Compensation for Survivors of Slave and Forced Labor: The Swiss
Bank Settlement and the German Foundation Provide Options for Recovery for Holocaust Survivors,
14 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 171, 198-99 n.204 (2001) (noting provision for distribution to heirs of
class members who are deceased, but only for those who die after the settlement date).
109. See generally Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 16, at 1406-10 (discussing the litiga-
tion history of the Holocaust cases).
110. Neuborne, supra note 107, at 621.
111. Id. at 619.
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keep the public eye on the issue until defendants chose to settle.11 2
Nevertheless, it is instructive to note that the Holocaust litigation,
which many advocates see as a model for slave reparations, differs sig-
nificantly in its vulnerability to attenuation arguments.
Other successful mass restitution cases are no more encouraging.
The claims brought on behalf of Japanese internees did not suffer
from victim attenuation; the claimants were the same people who had
been interned. 113 Similarly, the massive tobacco litigation, which re-
sulted in a settlement, did not suffer from the same attenuation
problems. 114 The tobacco companies were the original harming par-
ties, and the claimants were the original victims. Significantly, in some
strands of related tobacco litigation that did introduce victim attenua-
tion concerns, the cases were dismissed. For example, qui-tam-like
claims' 15 under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act,11 6 which suffered
from conceptual separation similar to victim attenuation, were eventu-
ally dismissed.11 7
Indeed, the cases that have manifested all three kinds of attenua-
tion are most striking for their failure to achieve a satisfactory resolu-
tion. Cases involving claims brought on behalf of Native Americans
are similar to reparations cases in that they involve victim attenuation,
act attenuation, and wrongdoer attenuation. These cases have not
generally been successful.118 No generalized tort or human-rights-
based action for crimes against Native Americans has succeeded.
Where Native American redress claims have succeeded, it has been on
the basis of treaties signed with individual tribes.' 9 Of course, no such
112. Id. ("[T]he litigation was as much about politics as it was about law.... Law
provided the roadmap [for settlement], but did not necessarily provide the fuel.").
113. See Hylton, Framework, supra note 14, at 32-33; Dale Minami, Japanese-American Re-
dress, 6 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REp. 27 (2004).
114. Some reparations advocates have suggested that the use of restitution theory to
extract a settlement in the tobacco cases is a possible model for reparations. See Sebok, Two
Concepts, supra note 16, at 1406.
115. These claims were brought by third parties on behalf of Medicare. As such, they
are qui tam-ike in nature, relying on the injury to a third party (the government). See
Mason v. Am. Tobacco Co., 212 F. Supp. 2d 88 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing claims under
Medicare Secondary Payer Act).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (b)(3)(A) (2000).
117. Claims under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act were brought to collect for to-
bacco-related expenses of patients paid by Medicare. See Mason v. Am. Tobacco Co., 212 F.
Supp. 2d 88 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (dismissing these claims).
118. See generally Lindsay Glauner, The Need for Accountability and Reparation: 1830-1976
the United States Government's Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and Execution of the Crime of
Genocide Against Native Americans, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 911 (2002).
119. Mishael A. Danielson & Alexis Pimentel, Give Them Their Due: An African-American
Reparations Program Based on the Native American Federal Aid Model, 10 WASH. & LEE RACE &
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treaties exist in the slave context. Indeed, it is not an overstatement to
say that no case that suffered from all three kinds of attenuation has success-
fully proceeded to a successful resolution through trial or settlement. This is a
dire diagnosis for reparations.
It is questionable exactly how many types of attenuation can be
present in a case before the case collapses. Obviously, one type alone
can be fatal in some cases. But can a case ever succeed if it faces three
types of attenuation? This is unclear. It may be possible to address one
or more kinds, such as through efforts by reparations advocates to
address wrongdoer attenuation by bringing suit against corporate en-
tities. But as noted in that discussion, that solution only increased act
attenuation. Is it possible to deal with all three types at once? That is
the challenge that reparations advocates face, and it is a primary rea-
son that reparations claims are failing today. Because of the presence
of all three kinds of attenuation it is not clear that reparations litiga-
tion can ever succeed; if it does, it will be a trailblazer. It is sobering to
note that only by overcoming attenuation in a truly unprecedented
manner could reparations cases succeed in court.
Ultimately, however, reparations cases may not be best suited for
success in court.120 Most of the major cases that reparations advocates
often seek to emulate, including the Holocaust litigation, tobacco liti-
gation, and suits for Americans of Japanese ancestry, succeeded not
through judicial fiat but through negotiated settlement. 12 1 Successful
emulation of that model means keeping a court case alive in order to
keep up consistent legal pressure while moral and political arguments
are brought to bear. That court case, however, need not ultimately be
a legal winner itself. The key for reparations at this juncture is to con-
tinue to advance ideas, particularly ideas that could counter the
thorny problems created by attenuation.
ETHNIC ANc. L.J. 89, 108 (2004) ("America has recognized a fiduciary duty towards Native
American tribes pursuant to various treaty obligations and a network of statutes that im-
pose certain specific responsibilities on the government."); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d
1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 1995).
120. Many reparations advocates candidly admit that reparations are unlikely to be
awarded at trial, and that the most fruitful route is through a legislative act or some sort of
settlement. Westley, supra note 52, at 436 (arguing that it is Congress, and possibly state
legislatures, that must be persuaded to enact reparations); Brophy, Some Problems, supra
note 1, at 534-39 (noting need for development of dialogue and scholarship to address the
possibility of settlement); Miller, supra note 10, at 51-57 (suggesting that settlement is
more likely to be successful than litigation); Wenger, supra note 1, at 256-58 (same).
121. See Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 16, at 1405-16 (noting history of tobacco and
Holocaust litigation).
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IV. The Tools of Mass Torts Can Be Used to Address
Attenuation in the Reparations Context
It is very surprising that, despite the profound analogy between
attenuation and similar concerns that come up in mass tort litigation,
there has been very little discussion thus far of how to apply mass tort
concepts in the reparations context. 122 Courts and scholars have ad-
dressed complicated issues of causation in the mass tort context. In-
deed, slavery itself can be viewed as one of the earliest mass torts.
This Part explores the analogy between reparations and mass
torts. I do this as follows: Section A will examine similarities between
causation issues in mass torts and in reparations, and Section B will
discuss some of the issues of causation that arise in the mass tort
context.
A. Similarities Exist Between Reparations Concerns and Mass Tort
Concerns
Using the terminology of victim, wrongdoer, and act attenuation
developed in Part II of this Article, we can see how the problems of
attenuation that affect mass torts have much in common with those
that plague reparations lawsuits. Mass tort litigation presents the same
concerns of victim, wrongdoer, and act attenuation. In both cases, the
real problem is the same: there is a potential connection between
claimants and payers, but it is of undeterminable strength. It is hard to
match the victim to the wrongdoer and to match the parties to the
harm.
In fact, many mass tort issues could be reframed using the afore-
mentioned categories of attenuation. For example, the problems of
tracing a particular cancer to a defendant's product are created by act
attenuation. The problem of identifying a culpable defendant from
among a pool who have manufactured fungible products in a large
market is a problem of wrongdoer attenuation. And the problem of
connecting a harm to children and grandchildren of the originally
harmed party-for example, the so-called "DES granddaughters"-is
a problem of victim attenuation. In addition, there is the causation
problem related to the victim attenuation concern of standing.
For example, the applicability of victim, wrongdoer, and act at-
tenuation is visible in the litigation surrounding the drug diethylstil-
122. The major exception is Hackney, supra note 10, which briefly discusses some of
these concepts.
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bestrol, better known as DES. 123 DES was a drug commonly given to
pregnant women over a period of time, and it ultimately proved to
have deleterious effects on many of the children of those women. 124
Litigants in the many strands of DES litigation faced victim attenua-
tion defenses, since the daughters and granddaughters of women who
took DES brought claims for harms done to them. 125 Litigants also
faced wrongdoer attenuation problems as in some cases it was difficult
to trace DES pills to a particular manufacturer. Finally, litigants faced
act attenuation concerns as they sought to link their harms to the
drug.126 The mass tort issues as mapped onto an attenuation grid
would follow along these lines: wrongdoer attenuation is similar to
difficulties in tracing harm to a specific tortfeasor;127 victim attenua-
tion is similar to the difficulty of tracing harm to later victims, particu-
larly in cases such as the DES granddaughters; act attenuation is
similar to the problem of linking harm to a defendant's actions.
As in the mass tort context, the harm to modern slave descend-
ants caused by slavery is of underdetermined causation. Like the case
of ships and safeguards, or in the case of DES granddaughters or
Agent Orange veterans, we cannot know if a defendant's alternate
choice not to enslave would have resulted in greater assets being given
to any particular slave descendant. Since attenuated causation in repa-
rations cases presents a problem analogous to that of mass torts, it is
helpful to see how courts have addressed these issues in the mass torts
context.
B. Conceptual Tools in the Mass Torts Context That Address
Causation
Tort law in general, and mass torts in particular, have developed
means of dealing with underdetermination. While attenuated causa-
tion may complicate the legal inquiry, it does not altogether rule out a
123. See Richard M. Russell, Note, The Causation Requirement: Guardian of Fairness or Ob-
stacle to Justice? Making Sense of a Decade of DES Litigation, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1071,
1071-81 (1991) (discussing DES litigation).
124. Id.
125. Ultimately, the litigants with the biggest victim attenuation problem, DES grand-
daughters, did not have great success in court. See infra note 146-147 and accompanying
text.
126. Though for DES litigants, act attenuation was not a big hurdle as causation was
established early for some harms. See Russell, supra note 123, at 1074-81.
127. Also, issues of wrongdoer attenuation may arise in addressing successor liability
for damages. See generally Michael D. Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutoiy
Reform to Protect Products Liability Claimants, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 17 (1986) (discussing theo-
retical successor liability issues).
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finding of legal causation. This Section will discuss how tort law has
dealt with attenuated causation through the application of various
doctrines that permit recovery even in situations where the initial
event in a chain of events is insufficient in bringing about a second
event. That is, certain tort doctrines are sometimes used to overcome
attenuation and permit recovery. Because they function in this way,
they are of particular interest in the reparations discussion. The doc-
trine of loss of chance will be discussed in Section 1, burden shifting
in Section 2, market share liability in Section 3, and substantial factor
in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 will focus on the use of statistical
evidence.
1. Loss of Chance Theory Allows for Recovery Even Where
Causation Is Underdetermined
The tort system allows recovery in some underdetermined
cases. 128 A useful example is the imposition of liability for those ship
owners that did not adequately protect against those sailors being
washed overboard. In a well-known law review article, Wex Malone
studied these cases and found that courts moved from a policy of not
imposing liability to a policy of imposing liability nearly all of the
time. 129 Significantly, courts were willing to impose liability despite
the conceptual difficulty of not knowing whether the victim would
have been in a position to benefit from the increase in safety.130 Ac-
cording to Malone:
It would be futile for the courts to recognize a duty to provide
emergency equipment and to impose an obligation to proceed
promptly to the rescue if the defendant could successfully seize
upon the uncertainty which nearly always attends the rescue opera-
tion as a reason for dismissing the claim. 131
Tort scholars have suggested various theoretical approaches ex-
plaining why courts should allow liability even where causation is un-
derdetermined. Malone refers to many of these cases as involving the
loss of a "gambler's chance." 132 In such cases, a defendant facilitates
128. See Twerski & Sebok, supra note 36, at 1381; Malone, supra note 31, at 72-73.
129. Malone, supra note 31, at 75-77.
130. Twerski & Sebok, supra note 36, at 1380; GRAY, supra note 9, at 97-100 & n.18
(discussing cases).
131. Malone, supra note 31, at 77.
132. Id. at 80; see also Twerski & Sebok, supra note 36, at 1381. The loss of the gambler's
chance can be a significant loss. In many instances, without a defendant's actions, "some
value would have been preserved . .. ." Malone, supra note 31, at 80.
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the realization of an independently created risk.' 33 That is, there is an
independent risk of being washed overboard. However, the sailors
would have a "gambler's chance" at survival if the ship owners imple-
mented some basic safety measures. Courts are not always willing to
find liability in gambler's chance cases, however, and are most willing
to find liability in cases where a defendant had notice of a potential
harm.134 Similarly, courts are more willing to find liability where de-
fendants violated a rule "designed to protect" against the harm that in
fact occurred. 135 The gambler's chance lost by slave descendants is
likely to be quite substantial.
1 36
2. Courts Can Employ Burden Shifting to Find Causation,
Particularly Where Other Factors Are Present
Burden shifting is also effective in many cases where neither cau-
sation nor non-causation can be definitively shown. 13 7 Summers v.
Tice13 8 is the classic case illustrating burden shifting and involved a
hunting accident where it was impossible to determine which of two
negligent shooters had caused the injury. 139 The court held that
"practical justice" allowed the burden to shift to the defendants and
required them to establish that they were not the cause of harm. 140
A similar approach appears in some mass tort cases. The court in
Bichler v. Eli Lilly, 14' a DES case, noted:
There have been several approaches in tort law available to a plain-
tiff confronted with more than one actor who could be the causa-
tion in fact. In such instances where each such party acted
133. Twerski & Sebok, supra note 36, at 1383; see also id. at 1383-84 (giving examples);
Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. Rav. 435, 439-48 (1999).
134. Twerski & Sebok, supra note 36, at 1385-86.
135. Malone, supra note 31, at 73.
136. Hylton, Slavery, supra note 17, at 39 (suggesting that descendants might have an
approximately forty percent chance of inheriting excess wealth from four generations
removed).
137. Robinson, DES cases, supra note 31, at 721-26; GRAY, supra note 9, at 117-18 (dis-
cussing burden shifting).
138. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
139. Id. at 9-14; Robinson, DES cases, supra note 31, at 715. In Summers, the court ruled
that both hunters could be held liable. Summers, 199 P.2d at 2; see also Malone, supra note
31, at 83 (stating that the court was unwilling to let "two wrongdoers .. .pass the ball");
KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, at 271 ("It seems a very desirable solution where negligence
on the part of both defendants is clear, and it is only the issue of causation which is in
doubt, so that the choice must be made between letting the loss due to failure of proof fall
upon the innocent plaintiff or the culpable defendants."); GRAY, supra note 9, at 102-04
(same).
140. Summers, 199 P.2d at 9-14.
141. 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (App. Div. 1981).
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independently but tortiously and it is proved that injury has been
caused to plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as
to which one caused it, and where each can be joined as a defen-
dant in the case, some courts have shifted the burden of proof of
causation in fact to the defendants. 142
The Bichler court also found that since the defendants had acted
in a similar manner and were aware of the possibility of harm, they
could be held liable, even if the harm could not be directly traced to
one particular defendant.1 43 Other DES courts have also adopted
some version of group liability. 144 This is similar to the idea of "enter-
prise liability," which was applied in other mass tort settings to find
that all actors in an industry are liable for foreseeable harms.1 45
Courts have been divided in DES granddaughters cases with some
courts allowing DES granddaughters to pursue claims against the DES
manufacturers and other courts barring these claims. 146 The burden
shifting used by some DES courts is dispositive, since typically defend-
ants are as unable to disprove causation as plaintiffs are unable to
prove it. 1 4 7
Scholars have suggested that courts are most likely to shift bur-
dens, either explicitly or implicitly, and find liability in un-
derdetermined causation cases where certain other factors are
present.1 48 For example, courts are more willing to find liability if the
tort is an intentional tort, or if the harm is easily foreseeable. 149 Courts
may reject cases where the chance of harm is particularly low.150 They
142. Id. at 630.
143. Id. at 630-31.
144. See, e.g., Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1994); see generally Robert A.
Baruch, Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shi from Individual to Group Responsibility in the Law of
Causation of Injuy, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1473, 1493-97 (1986) (discussing several DES cases).
This development has also been rejected by some courts. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs.,
473 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
145. See, e.g., Hall v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 376 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
146. John B. Maynard, Note, Third-Generation-DES Claims, 27 NEw ENG. L. REv. 241,
251-61 (1992) (discussing cases); Bowe v. Abbott Labs., 608 N.E.2d 223 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992); Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E.2d 696, 700-01 (Ohio 1992) (denying recovery);
Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 204 (N.Y. 1991) (claim could not proceed be-
cause of preconception tort doctrine); DeMayo v. Schmitt, 5 Pa. D. & C.4th 197 (C.P. Phila.
County 1989) (allowing claim for negligence to be stated). See generally Julie A. Greenberg,
Reconceptualizing Preconception Torts, 64 TENN. L. REv. 315, 320-35 (1997) (discussing the
cases).
147. Robinson, DES cases, supra note 31, at 729.
148. Twerski & Sebok, supra note 36, at 1381-86.
149. Id. at 1381; Malone, supra note 31, at 72-73, 85-87.
150. See Twerski & Sebok, supra note 36, at 1387 (noting that the lower the probability
that defendant's act was not a cause, the lower the probability of a court imposing liability);
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may also be likely to find liability where a party engaged in particularly
noxious acts.151
3. Market Share Liability Can Overcome the Attenuation Hurdle,
Even Where Multiple Tortfeasors Exist
Market share liability is a unique application of burden shifting.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories152 used burden shifting, holding defendant
DES manufacturers liable unless they could show that they did not
cause plaintiffs' harm.153 The court held that since multiple actors
contributed to the harm and causation was not individually traceable,
all of the potential contributors could be held responsible. 15 4 Sindell
has been called a "modified Summers" case because it allowed the de-
fendants to pay in proportion to the harm they caused. 155 The court
adopted reasoning similar to that in Summers, noting that "as between
an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear
the cost of the injury." 156 While market share liability may not apply in
all cases, it remains an important way in which courts may shift the
burden in cases where there are multiple defendants of varying levels
of culpability. In such cases, courts may use market share to find in
favor of the plaintiff even where the causative link is relatively weak.15 7
4. Application of the Substantial Factor Test Can Overcome
Overdetermined Causation
Courts may also apply the "substantial factor" test to find causa-
tion, allowing liability in cases where a defendant's actions were a sub-
see also id. at 1387-90 (discussing the difficulty of dealing with low probabilities in a world
of full compensation). The conceptual problem is that a court may be faced with two un-
pleasant choices: either to overdeter, or to allow defendants to escape liability entirely. Id.
151. See id. at 1386 (suggesting that the very production of handguns carries culpabil-
ity); Rabin, supra note 133, at 453 (noting that handguns are designed for a dangerous
purpose).
152. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
153. Robinson, DES cases, supra note 31, at 717. The court opted to make the DES
manufacturers show that they did not cause the injury, rather than making the victims
show causation. Id. at 714-15. The court adopted this position in part because it was easier
for defendants to maintain the kind of data that could be used to either show, or disprove,
causation. Id. at 734.
154. Id. at 729.
155. GRAY, supra note 9, at 105-06.
156. Sinde, 607 P.2d at 936.
157. Cf Russell, supra note 123, at 1102 ("That causation is a necessary element in any
tort action is well accepted. But the experience of man and developments in society have
prompted courts in the past to mitigate the consequences of strictly applying the causation
requirement.").
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stantial factor leading to the plaintiffs harm. 158 A defendant's actions
will be considered a substantial factor in causing a harm if they
"satisf[y] the but-for test (with an exception for simultaneous inde-
pendent sufficient causes) [and are] an appreciable and continuously
effective or efficient factor in producing the harm, up to the time of
occurrence of the harm." 159 The substantial factor test allows courts to
decide whether there is close enough affinity for the law to intervene
and label a defendant's conduct "wrong.'"160
Another useful analysis of substantial factor causation can be
found in the district court opinion in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 16' which
dealt with a class action suit against handgun manufacturers for the
harms caused by negligent distribution of handguns.1 62 The court
asked whether defendants' conduct was a "significant contributing fac-
tor in the development" of a harm or "a substantial factor ... increas-
ing the probability" of plaintiffs' harm.163 The underlying inquiry, as
suggested by commentators, was "if defendants had behaved differ-
ently, how many fewer plaintiffs would have been harmed?"1 64
The substantial factor test can be a useful tool to allocate liability
in cases involving overdetermined causation. Where a number of fac-
tors could each have created a harm, substantial factor analysis can be
used to differentiate which factors should be considered in holding a
defendant legally liable.
158. Malone, supra note 31, at 89-95 (discussing the substantial factor test).
159. Wright, supra note 8, at 1781; see also Robinson, DES cases, supra note 31, at 751
(noting that the substantial factor test is similar to the but-for test). One benefit of the
substantial factor test is that it prevents minor causes from creating liability. Id. at 715-16.
160. Malone, supra note 31, at 72.
161. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir.
2001).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 838.
164. Twerski & Sebok, supra note 36, at 1403-04. The judge noted that the defendants'
conduct was a "significant contributing factor in the development" of the ultimate harm.
Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 838. The evidence, wrote the court:
[W] as sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the negligent mar-
keting and distribution of handguns by manufacturers was a substantial factor in
the promotion and development of an underground illegal market supplying
New York criminals, and thus increasing the probability of death or serious injury
[to plaintiffs].
Twerski & Sebok, supra note 36, at 1398. On the jury's role in assessing punishment, see
generally Kaimipono David Wenger & David A. Hoffman, NullificatoryJuries, 2003 Wis. L.
REv. 1115, 1148-56.
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5. Statistical Evidence Can Provide the Necessary Association
Between the Defendant's Act and the Plaintiff's Harm
Faced with a variety of difficulties in showing causation in mass
tort cases, advocates, scholars, and courts have developed methods for
showing causation through statistical evidence. Scholars have argued
that a "probabilistic approach to causation" is proper in cases where a
large number of plaintiffs have been harmed by a group of defendants
and where intervening causation is possible, resulting in an inability to
definitely trace any individual plaintiffs injury to an individual defen-
dant's actions. 1 65 In these cases, scholars suggest that the amount re-
covered should be based on a "probability of causation" for a
defendant. 166
In In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation,167 Judge Wein-
stein suggested that plaintiffs would divide any recovery to reflect the
statistical increase in likelihood of harm they suffered. To address a
complex problem of underdetermination, Judge Weinstein applied
statistical causation, using a type of proportional liability in allocating
damages. 1 68 Statistical, pro rata distribution of damages was used be-
cause of the problem of indeterminate defendants and indeterminate
plaintiffs. 69 Recognizing the relative novelty of this approach, the
judge wrote: "We are in a different world of proof than that of the
archetypical smoking gun. We must make the best estimates of
165. Robinson, DES cases, supra note 31, at 759-60; Gold, supra note 42, at 384 (noting
that mass tort cases rarely involve particularistic evidence); Wendy Wagner, Note, Trans-
Science in Torts, 96 YALE L.J. 428, 433 n.28 (1986) (collecting cases); MarioJ. Rizzo & Frank
S. Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REv.
1399 (1980) (advocating the use of probabilistic causation in multiple cause cases).
166. Robinson, DES cases, supra note 31, at 766; see also Baruch, supra note 144, at
1490-92; Jack B. Weinstein & Robert Kushen, Scientific Evidence in Complex Litigation,
C-607 ALI-ABA Course of Study 709, 724 (July 24, 1991) ("Statistical data may ... permit
combinations of anecdotal and valid statistical data to prove guilt or establish some mate-
rial proposition of fact."). But cf Wright, supra note 8, at 1827 (suggesting that such devices
may result in the tort system becoming more of a wealth redistribution system and less of a
corrective justice system, and that such a change would be unfortunate).
167. 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
168. Id.; see also PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986) (describing the trial
and resolution, including the process of arriving at settlement).
169. Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 840-43. The court later wrote that causation could
not be established to allow liability. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp.
1223, 1229 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987) (granting summary judg-
ment to defendants against plaintiffs who had opted out of the certified class, since plain-
tiffs could not show a "causal link between exposure to Agent Orange and the various
diseases from which they are allegedly suffering"); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (also granting summary judgment against an opt-out
plaintiff), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
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probability that we can using the help of experts such as statisticians
and our own common sense and experience with the real
universe." 170
The court's analysis is instructive. Judge Weinstein noted that it
was quite possible that no particular plaintiff would be able to trace
her injuries to a particular defendant and that only statistics would
show any harm at all. He illustrated such a scenario:
Let us assume that there are 10 manufacturers and a population of
10 million persons exposed to their product. Assume that among
this population 1,000 cancers of a certain type could be expected,
but that 1,100 exist, and that this increase is "statistically signifi-
cant," permitting a reasonable conclusion that 100 cancers are due
to the product of the manufacturers.1 71
In such a case, Weinstein recognized, "no plaintiff can show that his
or her cancer was caused by any one of the defendants .... " 72 The
Agent Orange case was a clear instance of the underdetermined causa-
tion that is so common in mass torts. Similar concerns have dogged
lawsuits seeking compensation for harm caused by products such as
tobacco, asbestos, and DES.' 73
These concerns were also particularly acute in the DES litiga-
tion.174 DES was a drug that was used widely over a twenty-four year
period, until it was found to cause reproductive illness in children of
pregnant women who took the drug. 175 DES was manufactured by a
variety of companies, and many different types of DES tablets made by
different manufacturers were interchanged freely.' 76 They were fungi-
ble products. Not only was it difficult to determine whether plaintiffs'
injuries arose from DES; it was also difficult to trace the harm to any
particular defendant. 77 In most cases, claims were brought by daugh-
170. Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 838; see also In reJoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52
F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Causation in toxic torts normally comprises two separate
inquiries: whether the epidemiological or other scientific evidence establishes a causal link
between 'c' (asbestos exposure) and 'd' (colon cancer), and whether plaintiff is within the
class of persons to which inferences from the general causation evidence should be ap-
plied."); Rosenberg, supra note 45, at 859 (advocating proportional liability for defendants
"in proportion to the probability of causation" of harm to the plaintiff class members). But
cf Wright, supra note 8, at 1822-23 (arguing that mere statistics, even when based on
causal generalizations, cannot adequately show legal causation).
171. Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 837.
172. Id. at 838.
173. See AnthonyJ. Sebok, Pretext, Transparency, and Motive in Mass Restitution Litigation,
57 VAND. L. REV. 2177, 2184-86 (2004).
174. See Russell, supra note 123, at 1080.
175. See generally Robinson, DES cases, supra note 31, at 718-19.
176. Id. at 722-26.
177. Id.
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ters of women who ingested DES. In some cases, claims were brought
by granddaughters of the women as well. 178 Statistical evidence was
employed throughout the DES litigation to show a likelihood of harm
to plaintiffs, thus establishing causation. 179 Statistical evidence has
been used in a variety of other mass restitution contexts. These in-
clude litigation related to tobacco, asbestos, Benedictin, and other
products.180
Statistical causation in mass tort cases is generally shown by the
use of epidemiological studies.' 8 ' These are used to "determine
whether there is a statistical association between [a] defendant's prod-
uct and [the] plaintiff's disease by comparing the incidence of disease
in those exposed to [the] defendant's product with the disease's back-
ground rate." 8 2
178. See Maynard, supra note 146, at 285.
179. Tracey I. Batt, Note, DES Third-Generation Liability: A Proximate Cause, 18 CoARozo
L. REv. 1217, 1219-22 (1996); see alsoJames Brook, The Use of Statistical Evidence of Identifica-
tion in Civil Litigation: Well-Worn Hypotheticals, Real Cases, and Controversy, 29 ST. Louis U. L.
293, 327-28 (1985).
180. As summarized by one scholar:
One way the causal link was made in the tobacco cases was the introduction of
statistical methods of proof. Plaintiffs in the tobacco litigation were allowed to
show that a widely distributed product increased the aggregate number of state
residents who contracted a disease; such as lung cancer. In fact, this method of
proving causation seems to be widely accepted in canc.r-related cases .... In
toxic-tort cases involving exposure to the drug Bendectin, as well as silicone, her-
bicides, and asbestos, courts have allowed statistical evidence to demonstrate cau-
sation where direct proof of causation was lacking.
See Angela Lipanovich, Comment, Smoke Before Oil: Modeling a Suit Against the Auto and Oil
Industry on the Tobacco Tort Litigation Is Feasible, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 429, 463-64
(2005) (citations omitted).
181. Epidemiology is the branch of medical science that employs the integrated use of
statistics "to identify and establish the causes of human diseases." See Bert Black & David E.
Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FoRoDHAM L. REv. 732, 736 (1984).
As one writer notes:
The hallmark of epidemiology is that it is based on the study of populations, not
individuals. It seeks to establish associations between alleged causes and effects by
one of two methods: either comparing the incidence of disease across exposed
and unexposed populations, or comparing the incidence of exposure across sick
and healthy populations. With proper scientific interpretation, these correlations
lend great weight to an inference of causation.
Gold, supra note 42, at 379-80.
182. Berger, supra note 42, at 2125-26; see also Gold, supra note 42, at 384 (discussing
the phenomena of increased risk and enhanced probability of harm).
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V. The Application of Concepts Developed in Mass Torts in
Overcoming Act, Victim, and Wrongdoer Attenuation
in Reparations Suits
The same doctrinal tools used in the mass tort context-loss of
chance, burden shifting, market share liability, substantial factor, and
statistical evidence-can be used to address legal attenuation con-
cerns in reparations. Part V will examine the application of each of
these tools to the three types of attenuation that this Article has intro-
duced. In doing so, the Article will focus on ways that these estab-
lished routes around attenuation might apply in the environment of
reparations, and how they address the various attenuation concerns
that arise.
A. Tort-Based Reparations Claims
1. Confronting Reparations Challenges Based on Act Attenuation
Overcoming the problem of act attenuation requires showing a
link between the harm done to slaves and the harm to modern slave
descendants. As in the mass tort context, statistical analysis can be one
very helpful tool in showing this link. Other tort concepts like substan-
tial factor can also play a role in showing a legal link between slavery
and current harms.
Slave descendants could show a link between harm to slaves and
later harms suffered by slave descendants through the use of statistical
evidence on the economic effects of slave descent. 183 The alleged
harm to slave descendants is economic loss. It should be possible to
establish whether slave descendants as a group have a lower rate of
economic prosperity than the general populace. In particular, it
would be helpful, if statistically possible, to compare prosperity levels
of slave descendants against those of control groups, such as the de-
scendants of free Blacks. A study could show that slave descendants as
a group currently enjoy some ascertainable level of prosperity. Apply-
ing statistical tools, slave descendants could then seek to show
whether, absent slavery, they would have attained a greater level of
prosperity.
183. Cf Twerski & Sebok, supra note 36, at 1404, 1409 (suggesting that novel cases
particularly benefit from the use of statistical data). Of course, such a study may be com-
plex and difficult to perform. See Berger, supra note 42, at 2127-28 (noting the difficulty of
conducting epidemiological studies).
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The existence of such a gap seems likely, given the well-known
economic disparities between Blacks and members of other races. 18 4
Statistical evidence could serve to put a number on that gap. Such
application would probably involve, to adapt the language previously
used by Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation, an examination
along these lines:
Let us assume . . . a population of 10 million persons exposed to
[slave descent]. Assume that among this population 1,000 [persons
below the poverty line] could be expected, but that 1,100 exist, and
that this increase is "statistically significant," permitting a reasona-
ble conclusion that 100 [persons below the poverty line] are due to
the [slave descent].185
Similar analysis could be done for various degrees of prosperity,
allowing reparations advocates to put a solid number on the question
ofjust how slaves' lost property and lost wages affect their descendants
today. 186 Adapting language from torts, slave descendants could thus
show that slavery was a substantial factor in determining their prosper-
ity level and that compensation is therefore appropriate.
Reparations advocates can also point to existing cases to suggest
that slavery is the type of harm where burden shifting may be an ap-
propriate response to underdetermination. The harms inflicted under
slavery were intentional and not negligent, which is one indicator of
potential liability. 1 7 The harm against slaves and their children was
also foreseeable-another potential indicator of liability.,, Negative
effects on a victim's children are a logical result of severe wrongdo-
ing.18 9 The very act of slavery carries an "air of culpability," which
some commentators suggest is another indicator of liability. 190 Other
factors also weigh in favor of liability: slaves were subjected to inhu-
184. See supra note 52 (noting these statistics).
185. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
186. It is possible as well that statistics will weaken the case for reparations, for exam-
ple, by showing that the harm to slave descendants is not as great as envisioned.
187. Twerski & Sebok, supra note 36, at 1385-86.
188. Id. (discussing how juries consider underdetermined causation cases given the
foreseeability of harm).
189. To the extent that slave owners knew that they were harming slaves's children,
note Posner and Vermeule, it may be unreasonable to view victim attenuation as an obsta-
cle because slave descendants were a knowable victim themselves of slave owner wrongdo-
ing. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 10, at 700; see also Rosenberg, supra note 45, at 884
("But one could just as logically describe the defendant's duty in aggregative terms as a
duty extending from the defendant to a class-the exposed population. Such a view sug-
gests that the defendant's wrongdoing inflicts loss on the exposed population as a
whole.").
190. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 10; see also Wenger, supra note 1, at 202 n.34
(noting the argument that slavery was a violation of natural law); Randy E. Barnett, Was
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man treatment, 9 1 and an argument can be made that slavery was a
valueless act. 192
2. The Loss of Chance and Statistical Evidence Doctrines Can
Challenge Victim Attenuation Concerns to Overcome
Standing and Causation Hurdles
Tort concepts can also address victim attenuation concerns. Loss
of chance doctrine provides a conceptual hook to show harm to plain-
tiffs. Statistical evidence could also be used to demonstrate concrete
harm to slave descendants, thereby overcoming the standing hurdle
and eventually the causation hurdle.
The conceptual underpinning for overcoming victim attenuation
is simple enough. It is certainly true, as the Slave Descendants court
noted, that any number of eventualities could have deprived plaintiffs
from receiving economic benefits from their ancestors. 193 The plain-
tiffs' ancestors may have chosen to spend their wealth on them-
selves 194 or donate it to charity. They may have chosen to give it to
certain favored children, and plaintiffs' particular lines of parentage
might have been unrepresented. Even if plaintiffs' ancestors had fully
intended to pass on their wealth, they may have been unable to do so.
They may have needed assets to deal with daily expenses or emergen-
cies and had no money to pass on. They may have been poor money
managers, losing their assets in unwise investments. 195 They may have
been victims of the many financial uncertainties that the country has
seen, losing money to market crashes, business competition, changing
laws, wars, speculation, financial panics, currency fluctuation, and
inflation. 196
Slavery Unconstitutional Before the Thirteenth Amendment?: Lysander Spooner's Theory of Interpreta-
tion, 28 PAC. L.J. 977, 988-1014 (1997).
191. See Malone, supra note 31, at 95 (noting that "inhuman treatment" was a factor in
a court finding causation).
192. See id. at 86 (noting that courts are more likely to find causation if harmful act is
not valuable to society). But cf Wenger, supra note 1, at 239-40 (noting the economic value
of slavery to the country).
193. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (labeling plaintiffs claim "conjectural").
194. This is a reasonable possibility. There is no indication that plaintiffs intend to pass
on parts of any recovery to their descendants, rather than simply consuming it. See also
Hylton, Slavery, supra note 17, at 1241 ("Precariousness would have given the slave a strong
incentive to spend his money on his own desires right away.").
195. See id. ("The problem that remains is the passage of time, which allows for many
opportunities for money to be squandered or used in other ways.").
196. Sherwin, supra note 23, at 1445 ("[T]he passage of time and the countless human
acts and choices that have intervened lead to daunting problems in tracing the injury to
[Vol. 40
Every one of these is a possibility. And yet, it is also possible that
these ancestors, had they been paid for their labor, would have passed
down some amount of wealth, which would have eventually come to
the plaintiffs. 197 This is not an unrealistic scenario; many Americans
enjoy some measure of inherited wealth. 198 It is unrealistic to suggest
that none of the slave descendants would have received inherited
wealth. And therein lies the kicker-slave descendants can indeed
show that they suffered a concrete harm, namely the loss of a chance.
While they cannot show that they would ultimately have been the re-
cipients of assets, this inability exists only because they never got the
chance to receive assets in the first place. The lost chance suffered by
slave descendants is a real and concrete harm. Showing the statistical
likelihood of inheritance answers the recurring critique that the
amount of compensation is not calculable. 199
Statistical evidence can be used to show just how great of a
chance slave descendants lost. Slave descendants will need to show the
statistical likelihood of present claimants receiving wealth from slave
ancestors, as well as the likely amount of any inheritance. Although
accurately quantifying the loss of chance may be difficult, this number
should be calculable. Armed with such a number, slave descendants
can assert to a judge that they are not merely showing a genealogical
relationship; by depriving their ancestors of compensation, slave own-
current generations of African Americans and separating the harm of enslavement from
the effects of more recent public and private acts.").
197. As with other tort cases, the supposed breaks in the causal chain of harm to slave
descendants are not particularly debilitating. In particular, the court is concerned that it
cannot verify that slave ancestors would have given their assets to their descendants. This
concern is overstated, given that bequeathing assets to descendants is the normal course of
events. Hylton, Slavery, supra note 17, at 1241 ("To avoid reducing damages to descendants
for a reason that was not only beyond the slave's control but a foreseeable consequence of
the initial injury, we should assume that if paid, the slave would have passed the money on
at the same rate as parents in conventional families do."). But cf. Waldron, supra note 87, at
10 (noting the "whimsical" nature of property disposition).
198. See generally THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN-AMERICAN:
How WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY (2004) (discussing transfer of wealth between gen-
erations); Westley, supra note 52, at 440-45 (discussing economic disparities between
Blacks and whites).
199. See Richard Epstein, The Case Against Black Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1177, 1186
(2004) ("We have no idea of how much of that profit (assuming that it could be cali-
brated) actually descended to the next generation. The ordinary business will reinvest
some fraction of its profits, but will declare some as dividends and pay some out in salaries
to its employees. Dividends and wages do not descend to the next generation."); Massey,
supra note 10, at 164-65 ("[It] is impossible to know how much better off today's black
Americans would be, if at all. It is even more speculative to try pinning a number on the
loss suffered by any given contemporary individual descendant of American slavery.").
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ers deprived the slaves' descendants of a statistically measurable
sum.20 0 Despite the possibility of intervening causes, plaintiffs have
some statistically measurable, non-negligible chance of being the re-
cipients of their ancestors' wealth. 201 And it is almost certain that rep-
arations defendants could not establish that they were not the cause of
plaintiffs' injuries.
Even incomplete or preliminary statistical evidence should be
enough to overcome the standing issue that proved fatal in Slave De-
scendants. The but-for connection between slavery and eventual harm
to slave descendants is not in doubt; the only question is exactly how
much worse slave descendants have fared compared to control
groups. A court could apply loss of a chance doctrine, taking judicial
notice that but for slavery, slave descendants today would enjoy
greater prosperity. That admission, coupled with basic statistical evi-
dence, could be used to show the level of harm required for standing.
The standing analysis reflected in the current Slave Descendants
opinion is questionable and should be reconsidered. 20 2 The court's
standing analysis imposed on plaintiffs an unnecessarily high hur-
dle.2 0 3 Even reparations critics found the court's standing analysis
200. This number may be smaller than commentators assume. Indeed, economic stud-
ies suggest that, absent the presence of legal regimes to preserve wealth, it is difficult to
keep fortunes together. See generally John F. Hart, "A Less Proportion of Idle Proprietors"
Madison, Property Rights, and the Abolition of Fee Tail, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 167 (2001)
(discussing the effect of fee tail and primogeniture in preserving wealth between genera-
tions). Ironically, Blacks missed out on many of the devices, such as fee tail and primogeni-
ture, designed to maintain wealth. Thus, principles of corrective justice suggest that they
should be given the benefit of every doubt on whether they would have kept wealth and
passed it on to future generations.
201. Of course, the question might be complicated by the potential need for a Daubert-
approved statistical model in order to show standing.
202. See Sebok, The Lawsuit, supra note 73, at 1-2; Epstein, supra note 199, at 1179-81;
Eric J. Miller, Representing the Race: Standing to Sue in Reparations Lawsuits, 20 HARv. BLAcK-
LETrER L.J. 91, 93 (2004).
203. In particular, the court may be requiring a showing of proximate cause, when all
that is really required is a showing of but-for cause. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Jus-
ticiability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 17-18 (1984); Calabresi, supra note 8, at 71-73 (discussing the difference between
"three conceptions of 'cause': 'causal link,' 'but for cause,' and 'proximate cause'"); see also
Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of
Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 607 (1988) (suggesting that courts generally insist
on too high a burden of causation).
Prior to Lujan, standing could sometimes be established under rather attenuated theo-
ries of causation.
The [Supreme] Court has not ... required a showing of strict tort causation in
the sense that the complained of conduct be the but-for cause of the plaintiffs
harm. To the contrary, the Court has been willing to accept quite attenuated
theories of causation, at least at the pleading stage.
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flawed; the court's decision is "little more than a disguised ruling on
the merits," suggested one critic. 20 4 The Slave Descendants court sug-
gested that proximate causation must be fully established to show
standing. That idea, however, is contrary to the law and the literature
in this area.2 0 5
Of course, more detailed causal connection would ultimately be
needed to establish liability.206 This would likely depend on a showing
that slave descendants are statistically less prosperous than appropri-
ate control groups. In any event, statistical tools would be invaluable
in showing causation, both the basic causation level required to show
standing, and the more rigorous showing that would be needed to
establish liability. Other tort doctrines will also be useful at the liability
stage. For example, it might make sense for a court to use a substantial
factor test to determine liability. Statistics would play a major role in
that inquiry as well, to show whether slave descent is indeed a substan-
tial factor in determining the prosperity of slave descendants. The de-
tails of such an inquiry might include a comparison between the
wealth, income, or education levels of slave descendants, versus the
rest of the populace. Clear correlation between prosperity and slave
Karl S. Coplan, Refracting the Spectrum of Clean Water Act Standing in Light ofLujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 169, 185 (1997).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), applied a less forgiving eye to the
standing requirement. Lujan, however, did not alter the basic inquiry. Id. at 560-61. In
addition, Lujan sets forth a factual requirement to establish standing at the summary judg-
ment stage. See id. at 561. Lujan stated that "[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allega-
tions of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to
dismiss 'we presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are neces-
sary to support the claim." Id.
204. Epstein, supra note 199, at 1179-81. Courts are often accused of using standing to
dodge serious issues. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan ? Of Citizen Suits,
"Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 166 (1992); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D.
Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 962, 1009 (2002); Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal
Prosecutions Show that Standing Doctrine Is Lookingfor Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH.
L. REv. 2239, 2251-52 & n.63 (1999).
205. Standing requires showing three elements: injury in fact, causal connection to a
defendant, and redressability. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. This is a lesser burden than causa-
tion. As Richard Fallon argues, "the causation requirement of personal interest standing is
not that of proximate cause. It seems instead to replicate the tort law concept of 'cause in
fact' or 'but for' causation." Fallon, supra note 203, at 17 n.91; see also Epstein, supra note
199.
206. See Fallon, supra note 203, at 17-18 (discussing the difference between causation
and standing requirements); Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive
Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 307 n.70 (1982) (noting
this difference); Epstein, supra note 199, at 1181 (same).
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descent could show that slave descent is a substantial factor impacting
slave descendants' prosperity.
3. Sindell Provides a Framework for Overcoming Wrongdoer
Attenuation
Finally, the framework for apportioning liability set out in Sindell
and other DES cases may provide a means of overcoming wrongdoer
attenuation. In Sindell, the court found that DES manufacturers could
be held liable despite the inability of plaintiffs to connect directly the
manufacturers to the plaintiffs' harm.20 7 That court noted, "as be-
tween an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter
should bear the cost of the injury."20° Similar reasoning applies in rep-
arations: where the choice is between letting harm lie with descend-
ants of innocent slaves, or with the corporate entities who participated
in slavery, it makes sense to favor slave descendants. Sindell appor-
tioned liability according to the market share of each defendant.209
That framework, if adopted in the reparations context, could poten-
tially resolve many thorny distributional questions.
There are, however, significant conceptual hurdles that could im-
pede application of Sindell to reparations. In Sindell, the major players
in the DES market-who collectively comprised a large majority of the
relevant market actors-were all joined in the litigation.2 10 Because of
this, the Sindell apportionment scheme seemed fair in a broad sense-
most of the market was represented by the defendants joined in the
case, and the only question was how to divide liability between appar-
ently liable parties.
In contrast, market share liability in the reparations context is less
compelling, precisely because it is not possible to join individual de-
fendants representing even a majority of the slavery market. Certain
long-lived individual corporate slave market participants still exist and
are defendants in reparations litigation.211 It is all but certain, how-
ever, that the majority of the private actor participants in the slave
207. See supra notes 152-155 and accompanying text.
208. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936-37 (Cal. 1980).
209. The Sindell court used proportional liability, allocating liability between the de-
fendants in proportion to their market share. Id. at 936-38.
210. Id. at 936-37 (noting that joined defendants comprised ninety percent of the DES
market).
211. Some of the corporate defendants include insurer Aetna, railroad company CSX,
tobacco producer RJR Reynolds, and bank FleetBoston. On corporate liability in general,
see Robinson, Corporate Responsibility, supra note 47, at 338-42; Miller, supra note 10, at
57-60.
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markets is no longer in existence or cannot be matched with any cur-
rent defendant. Existing reparations defendants represent only a
small percentage of the original slavery market. The market coverage
of joined defendants in the reparations litigation thus differs drasti-
cally from the market coverage present in Sindel. Because of that dif-
ference, direct application of a Sindell framework is not possible
without some kind of modification.
Various possibilities exist for adapting Sindell to the slavery mar-
ket. One possibility would be to join government actors as additional
defendants. This route has the benefit of creating a somewhat Sindell-
like level of market coverage. Combined with corporate defendants,
government actors could be viewed as comprising much of the slave
market. Nevertheless, any attempt to join government actors runs into
a host of problems, starting with sovereign immunity.21 2 In addition, it
is not clear that joining government actors would actually result in a
Sindel-like level of market coverage among the universe of joined de-
fendants. Government and corporate entities played different and
often overlapping roles in the slave market. It is not clear that adding
government actors would alter the market coverage of joined defend-
ants and make Sindell application any easier.
Another possibility would be to hold currently joined reparations
defendants liable for the acts of other participants in the slave market,
who have not been joined in the litigation. This approach is similar to
"enterprise liability" theories, which hold that any actors in an enter-
prise can be found liable for harms it causes. 21s Under such a system,
individual corporate actors could be held liable not only for their own
share of the original market, but also for the market share of the
many other actors no longer in existence. This would result in much
greater potential monetary recovery for plaintiffs since no portion of
the original market would be written off as judgment proof. Such a
framework raises potentially insuperable questions of fairness,
though, because it imputes to existing defendants the shares of judg-
ment proof former market participants.
Finally, Sindell could be adapted in a more limited fashion to al-
low for pro rata recovery according to the market share of existing
defendants. Under such a system, each defendant would be liable for
its own portion of the original market for slavery, as defendants in
212. See generally Wenger, supra note 1, at 243-49 (discussing government defenses
against reparations claims).
213. See Hall v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); WEINSTEIN, supra note 45, at 149-52 (discussing enterprise liability).
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Sindell were liable for their portions of the DES market. However,
those portions of the initial market not represented by current de-
fendants-almost certainly the vast majority of the market for slav-
ery-would simply be written off as uncollectible. Thus, if slave
descendants can join defendants representing 10% of the slave mar-
ket, then they can collect damages representing 10% of the economic
harm suffered by slave descendants. The remaining 90% would be at-
tributable to non-collectable (perhaps non-existent) entities. This ap-
proach would provide a lower level of potential monetary recovery to
slave descendants, since the majority of claims would be written off as
uncollectible. Those would be the claims attributed to participants in
the original market, who are notjoined to the current litigation. How-
ever, because this modification would not force any defendant to pay
for harm greater than its percent of market share, it is the least prob-
lematic route from a fairness standpoint.
B. Unjust Enrichment Claims Similarly Benefit from Use of Mass
Tort Doctrinal Tools
Although the foregoing analysis is addressed in torts, much of it
would apply to unjust enrichment claims as well. For example, unjust
enrichment claimants could use statistical evidence to attack victim
attenuation arguments. In addition Sindell-like market share restitu-
tion would be a way of avoiding wrongdoer attenuation in unjust en-
richment cases, as well as in tort cases.
The possibility of apportioning liability according to market
shares is particularly attractive in the unjust enrichment context.
Some scholars believe that unjust enrichment claims are the best op-
portunity for reparations. 214 Unjust enrichment offers significant ad-
vantages. For example, it offers a lower threshold of proof-a litigant
need merely show that it is more likely than not that a defendant was
unjustly enriched. 215 Violation of law need not be shown-as Emily
Sherwin notes, "[o]n its face, the term unjust enrichment reaches be-
yond what is illegal to what is simply unjust. Therefore, unlike com-
pensation, unjust enrichment can be read to cover conduct that was
morally wrong although sanctioned by law."216 As others have noted,
however, unjust enrichment claims run into difficulty at the remedy
stage.217 The question of how to apportion blame is not at all clear.
214. See, e.g., Sebok, Prosaic Justice, supra note 23, at 52.
215. Sherwin, supra note 23, at 1447-53.
216. Id. at 1448.
217. Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 16, at 1431-40.
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Thus, while unjust enrichment can answer some of the problems in-
herent in tort claims, they do not provide a clear avenue for remedy.
Sindell market share apportionment may be the best way to con-
vert unjust enrichment claims from academic fantasy into legal reality.
If market share liability provides a solution to the tracing problem,
unjust enrichment claims may become more viable. Like the DES case
addressed in Sindell, unjust enrichment claims run into the problem
of tracing. But also like Sindell, the harm alleged is largely fungible. In
Sindell, market share liability was feasible because all of the manufac-
turers had contributed to a nationwide pool of DES and the harm was
largely fungible. Injury from slave descent is similarly fungible, and all
defendants contributed to the formation of the nationwide system of
enslavement. Thus, market share liability in unjust enrichment is ap-
propriate. This solution is attractive because it is easy to implement. It
skips thorny theory questions at the implementation stage, offering a
viable method to calculate each defendant's contribution.
Finally, unjust enrichment claims might also benefit from statisti-
cal analysis. Victim and act attenuation problems in unjust enrich-
ment, like in tort, can be addressed through the use of statistical
evidence. That is, slave descendants could show that a harm was done
to them and can be statistically shown, and that that harm is linked to
acts of enslavement that provided a benefit of unjust enrichment to
defendants. Unjust enrichment requires a showing of "a benefit con-
ferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff."21 8 Statistical evidence may
provide the necessary link between defendants' acts and plaintiffs'
harm, allowing an unjust enrichment claim to prevail.
C. Recap
This Part has examined the idea of causation in the reparations
context and has offered suggestions on how to overcome the attenua-
tion hurdle in the litigation process. It is apparent that legal attenua-
tion critiques, including the Slave Descendants court's analysis, are
oversimplified. The question of causation in reparations requires anal-
ysis of underdetermined causation which does not always preclude lia-
bility. Reparations advocates should use the tools of mass tort,
particularly statistical causation, to establish liability. Statistical tools
may be used to show harm to modern claimants, resolving legal con-
cerns of victim and act attenuation and addressing standing problems.
Conceptual tools used in the DES and other cases, including modified
218. Hylton, Slavery, supra note 17, at 1427.
Winter 2006] SLAVERY REPARATIONS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
Sindell-style market share liability, can also be used to address wrong-
doer attenuation.
Conclusion
Much remains to be done. Reparations advocates must test statis-
tical causation arguments to see if they satisfy courts' lack of harm and
standing concerns. The arguments should be further developed and
refined for use in showing causation at trial, ultimately addressing act
attenuation concerns that may arise at that stage. The Sindell harm
contribution analysis should be employed as needed to address wrong-
doer attenuation.
Future steps might include tying these causal tools to particular
proposals for asset distribution. It is nearly impossible to discuss repa-
rations today without at least a nod to the many distribution critiques
raised by critics. 219 Questions of direct or group compensation-
themselves beyond the scope of this Article-will eventually need to
be answered. However, these may also eventually turn out to be ques-
tions best answered by examining the mass tort experience, with its
models for distribution to victims. 220
Despite the work that remains to be done, this Article shows that
theoretical tools from the mass tort context may be helpful in address-
ing attenuation in the reparations debate. Indeed, it turns out that
attenuation, like many other concerns about reparations, may provide
"grist for the mill of reparations critics, but... [is] familiar in law, and
the law has developed methods for dealing with (or ignoring) [it]."221
219. See generally Wenger, supra note 1, at 253-56 (noting different proposals for distri-
bution of reparations); Kyle D. Logue, Reparations as Redistribution, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1319,
1354-70 (discussing different models of distribution).
220. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 45, at 155-62.
221. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 10, at 702 (making this statement about poten-
tial problems in determining compensation amounts and in making any distribution of
restitution).
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